The Second French Revolution?

Not since 1792 could events in France have such an impact on the future of Europe

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On May 29, 2005, the citizens of France will go to the polls to vote on a referendum on whether to accept or reject the EU constitution. Many are quite aware that the outcome of this referendum will have a lasting effect on the future of Europe. Historiographically, the vote has the potential of shaking the foundations of the European social and political order as much as the storming of the Bastille did over 200 years ago.

Some might say this is overdramatising the situation a bit, that a comparison between the French Revolution and a referendum on the EU constitution is going a bit too far. Without doubt there is less violence and bloodshed this time round, but when looking at the deeper, underlying political significance of both events, we some striking similarities.

For one, the ideas of the French Revolution spread throughout Europe like a wildfire, albeit often with a little military help. Nevertheless, it was events in France which led to a domino effect throughout Europe, threatening the established social order of the time. The same can be said of the present day. In the Netherlands, it has transpired that if the French vote "no" on the EU constitution, then they won't even bother going ahead on their own referendum vote. Subsequently, other countries have followed suit: Warsaw, London, Prague, and Copenhagen likewise will forego their referendum vote if the French reject the EU constitution.

Much as in the monarchist regimes of old, the neo-liberalist regimes of present-day Europe appear to be in panic at the prospect of the lead horse which is pulling the EU cart suddenly stopping in its tracks and deciding that it's not going to pull any more. The alarm at such a prospect is such that rumors are rife about a "B" plan in face of a "no" vote, in which the French government will use some kind of political or constitutional trick to somehow nullify the vote or even change the outcome, much like George W. Bush did in the 2000 presidential elections in the US.

Revival of nationalism?

Another point of comparison between 1792 and 2005 is the role of nationalism in the unfolding of events. The French Revolution serves as the foundation of a unique form of French nationalism, one which transcends all political affiliations. Hence, it is the same French pride and the French "way of life" which is at the center of all political discourse, whether it is the left protesting against American cultural imperialism or the right complaining about foreign immigration.

It is this unique form of nationalism which now raises the prospect of a revival in the political fortunes of right wing parties throughout Europe. In Poland, for instance, the right has capitalised on the failing promises of EU expansion and globalisation, and looks set to make substantial gains in the upcoming Polish elections. The same can be said of many other new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, the radical right has traditionally criticised the French because of the Treaty of Trianon; now it seems all is forgiven as they pray that France will do the right thing and vote "no" in two weeks time.

The possible rise in the fortunes of the right as a indirect outcome of a "no" vote -- not only in France but in the rest of Europe -- has been seen by some as reason enough to persuade many French leftists to switch their "no" votes to a "yes". In many ways, it's a repetition of the French presidential elections, where the left was caught between a rock and a hard place: to either vote for the thief (Jacques Chirac) or the fascist (Jean-Marie Le Pen).

The EU is not popular

Yet it's not only the left which is concerned over the political implications of the referendum. Chirac himself is quite aware that the right will tend to vote "no" in the referendum as a form of nationalist rejection of the EU. Hence, his campaign for the EU constitution has been infused with nationalist rhetoric in order to try and persuade right-wing voters that the best safeguard for the French "way of life" is a "yes" vote.

With only two weeks to go, the vote is still too close to call. At the beginning it seemed the "no" side would win, but as the day of the referendum approaches some see the balance tipping toward the "yes" side. In spite of the final outcome, however, there is a message in all this that Eurocrats in Brussels must heed. As with the EU elections in the summer of 2004, the EU is not popular; its institutions are remote from the everyday lives of its citizens. Referring to this state of affairs as a simple "communication" problem, as the European Commission has often done, is foolhardy and merely sweeping the problem under the rug.

What lies at the very heart of the EU's declining popularity is the way in which it has been hastily forged together: basically, a neo-liberalist concept of Europe has been simply grafted on to a defunct economic foundation, better known as the European Economic Community (EEC). This hybrid creation pays lip service to notions of citizenry, human rights, and social justice.

At this point, what is needed is a "new deal", in which the concept of a united Europe is built from the ground up and not simply grafted on to a fifty year old treaty. Along these lines, it is perhaps best if the French vote "no" and reject the EU constitution so that a new Europe can be created from the ruins of the old, one in which a constitution governing a united Europe is written by Europeans, and not by a gang of unelected and unaccountable neo-liberalist Eurocrats isolated in Brussels.