Besonders faszinierend fand ich, dass die Spiegelschreiberlinge den
regierungsamtlichen 9/11-Mythos selbst nicht glauben. Da dieser
Mythos ja auch die Legende ist, die der Spiegel verbreitet, glauben
diese "Journalisten" also ihren eigenen Scheiß nicht.
Gut, das ist so überraschend zwar nicht, aber dass einer es mal
zugibt, ist schon ein starkes Stück.
Zu Philip Zelikow möchte ich noch ein paar Hintergrundinformationen
liefern.
Der eigentliche Autor des regierungsamtlichen Mythos', Philip
Zelikow, der den Commission Report bis zu den einzelnen
Unter-Unter-Überschriften fertig hatte bevor die
"Untersuchungs"kommission mit dem Sichten der Indizien begann, hat
über "public myths" promoviert. In seinem Fall dadurch ein
außerordentlich praxisnahes Thema, dass er es selbst in die Praxis
umgesetzt hat.
aus Wiki:
While at Harvard, he worked with Ernest May and Richard Neustadt on
the use, and misuse, of history in policymaking. They observed, as
Zelikow noted in his own words, that "contemporary" history is
"defined functionally by those critical people and events that go
into forming the public's presumptions about its immediate past. The
idea of 'public presumption'," he explained, "is akin to William
McNeill's notion of 'public myth' but without the negative
implication sometimes invoked by the word 'myth.' Such presumptions
are beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to
be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant
political community."
und aus History Commons: October 15, 1998: Future 9/11 Commission
Executive Director Zelikow Says ‘Public Assumptions’ Shape Views of
History
In his opening remarks at a conference on contemporary political
history organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the
University of Virginia, future 9/11 Commission Executive Director
Philip Zelikow emphasizes that the public understanding of history is
shaped by what are sometimes referred to as “public myths.”
“[U]nderstanding contemporary political history is extremely
important and constantly alive in public discourse. ‘Contemporary’ is
defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into
forming the public’s presumptions about its immediate past.
This idea of ‘public presumption’ is akin to William McNeill’s notion
of ‘public myth’ but without the negative implication sometimes
invoked by the word ‘myth.’ Such presumptions are beliefs (1) thought
to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with
certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant political
community. The sources for such presumptions are both personal (from
direct experience) and vicarious (from books, movies, and myths).”
Zelikow says that public assumptions often grow out of “searing
events”: “particularly ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events take on
‘transcendent’ importance and, therefore, retain their power even as
the experiencing generation passes from the scene.” [Zelikow, 1999
pdf file]
In a previous publication, Zelikow had written about how a
“catastrophic terrorism” event could constitute a momentous,
history-shaping milestone: “An act of catastrophic terrorism that
killed thousands or tens of thousands of people… would be a watershed
event in America’s history.… Like Pearl Harbor, such an event would
divide our past and future into a ‘before’ and ‘after’” (see November
1997-August 1998).
regierungsamtlichen 9/11-Mythos selbst nicht glauben. Da dieser
Mythos ja auch die Legende ist, die der Spiegel verbreitet, glauben
diese "Journalisten" also ihren eigenen Scheiß nicht.
Gut, das ist so überraschend zwar nicht, aber dass einer es mal
zugibt, ist schon ein starkes Stück.
Zu Philip Zelikow möchte ich noch ein paar Hintergrundinformationen
liefern.
Der eigentliche Autor des regierungsamtlichen Mythos', Philip
Zelikow, der den Commission Report bis zu den einzelnen
Unter-Unter-Überschriften fertig hatte bevor die
"Untersuchungs"kommission mit dem Sichten der Indizien begann, hat
über "public myths" promoviert. In seinem Fall dadurch ein
außerordentlich praxisnahes Thema, dass er es selbst in die Praxis
umgesetzt hat.
aus Wiki:
While at Harvard, he worked with Ernest May and Richard Neustadt on
the use, and misuse, of history in policymaking. They observed, as
Zelikow noted in his own words, that "contemporary" history is
"defined functionally by those critical people and events that go
into forming the public's presumptions about its immediate past. The
idea of 'public presumption'," he explained, "is akin to William
McNeill's notion of 'public myth' but without the negative
implication sometimes invoked by the word 'myth.' Such presumptions
are beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to
be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant
political community."
und aus History Commons: October 15, 1998: Future 9/11 Commission
Executive Director Zelikow Says ‘Public Assumptions’ Shape Views of
History
In his opening remarks at a conference on contemporary political
history organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the
University of Virginia, future 9/11 Commission Executive Director
Philip Zelikow emphasizes that the public understanding of history is
shaped by what are sometimes referred to as “public myths.”
“[U]nderstanding contemporary political history is extremely
important and constantly alive in public discourse. ‘Contemporary’ is
defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into
forming the public’s presumptions about its immediate past.
This idea of ‘public presumption’ is akin to William McNeill’s notion
of ‘public myth’ but without the negative implication sometimes
invoked by the word ‘myth.’ Such presumptions are beliefs (1) thought
to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with
certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant political
community. The sources for such presumptions are both personal (from
direct experience) and vicarious (from books, movies, and myths).”
Zelikow says that public assumptions often grow out of “searing
events”: “particularly ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events take on
‘transcendent’ importance and, therefore, retain their power even as
the experiencing generation passes from the scene.” [Zelikow, 1999
pdf file]
In a previous publication, Zelikow had written about how a
“catastrophic terrorism” event could constitute a momentous,
history-shaping milestone: “An act of catastrophic terrorism that
killed thousands or tens of thousands of people… would be a watershed
event in America’s history.… Like Pearl Harbor, such an event would
divide our past and future into a ‘before’ and ‘after’” (see November
1997-August 1998).