Oriens schrieb am 14. April 2005 16:32
> coolcalmcollected schrieb am 14. April 2005 9:08
>
> > > Auch gilt: Je brutaler ein (für westliche Wirtschaftsinteressen)
> > > passendes Regime seine Bevölkerung traktiert, umso höher fällt die
> > > Unterstützung durch Staaten wie die USA aus (...)
> > >
> > > Wenn die Beseitigung einer Dikatatur aus dem Volk heraus passiert,
> > > verläuft es vergleichsweise unblutig. Siehe Ceaucescu in Rumänien (der
> > > übrigens ebenfalls von den USA unterstützt wurde).
>
> Rumänien war ein Teil des soz. Lagers. Wenn irgendwer etwas in dem
> Land zu verantworten hat, sind es die kommunistischen Machthaber.
Ja? Ceausescu war beispielsweise beim ehemaligen US-amerikanischen
Verteidigungsminister McNamara (der wesentlich an der Terrorkampagne
der USA gegen Kuba zur Amtszeit Kennedys beteiligt war) so beliebt,
dass er ihn begeistert mit Milliarden Dollar unterstützt hat.
McNamara hatte wohl erkannt, das der rumänische Diktator aus dem
gleichen Holz geschnitzt war wie die anderen brutalen "Darlings" der
US-Außenpolitik: Duvalier, Marcos, Mobuto, Saddam Hussein, usw. usf:
http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn03012004.html
"The managerial ideal for McNamara was managerial dictatorship. World
Bank loans surged to Pinochet's Chile after Allende's overthrow, to
Uruguay, to Argentina, to Brazil after the military coup, to the
Philippines, to Suharto after the '65 coup in Indonesia.
And to the Romania of Ceausescu. McNamara poured money--$2.36 billion
between 1974 and 1982--into the tyrant's hands. In 1980 Romania was
the Bank's eighth biggest borrower. As McNamara crowed delightedly
about his "faith in the financial morality of socialist countries"
Ceausescu razed whole villages, turned hundreds of square miles of
prime farm land into open- pit mines, polluted the air with coal and
lignite, turned Rumania into one vast prison, applauded by the Bank
in an amazing 1979 economic study as being a fine advertisement for
the "Importance of Centralized Economic Control".
Another section of that same 1979 report, titled "Development of
Human Resources", featured these chilling words: "To improve the
standards of living of the population as a beneficiary of the
development process, the government has pursued policies to make
better use of the population as a factor of production... An
essential feature of the overall manpower policy has been ... to
stimulate an increase in birth rates." Ceausescu forbade abortions,
and cut off disrtribution of contraceptives. Result: ten of thousand
of abandoned children, dumped in orphanages, another sacrificial
hecatomb in McNamara's lethal hubris."
> > Tote durch den Überfall der USA und GB, beginnend März 2003:
> > Vermutlich weit über 100.000 tote Iraker.
>
> Pure Spekulation! Eine rein statistische Analyse. Wenn du schon gern
> mit Zahlen jonglierst dann nimm diese, da verschwindet sofort eine
> Null.
> http://www.iraqbodycount.net/database/
> Die Zahen liegen zwische 17 000 und 20 000!
Nein. Ich vertraue der Studie, bei der irakische Haushalte
tatsächlich befragt wurden. Das ist zuverlässiger und man kommt zu
wesentlich stichhaltigeren Ergebnissen:
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=6565
"100,000 Iraqis Dead: Should We Believe It?
(...)
So let's examine the data in this article. Of course, we don't have
the raw data in the researchers' computers. But we do have the wealth
of data they present in the article. These data go considerably
beyond the estimates of relative risk and excess mortality.
One issue to examine is: are the deaths localized in one cluster that
may be atypical of the country as a whole? Of course, the death rate
in Falluja was far higher than that for the rest of the country.
(More on this below). The authors provide information on the
distribution of deaths in their Figure 1, which illustrated the pre-
and post-invasion death rates in the randomly selected clusters in 11
of Iraq's Governorates. One of these Governorates is Falluja, with
mortality rates over 10 times higher than the rest of the country.
For another Governorate, Sulaymaniya, the post-invasion rate was
considerably lower than the pre-invasion rate, while for two others,
Karbala and Ninawa, the rates were essentially equal. Now,
Sulaymaniya is in the Kurdish north of the country, under the firm
control of the Kurdistan Regional Government, where there is no
insurgency and no Coalition attacks. The other seven Governorates all
exhibit considerable increases in mortality rates post-invasion.
Thus, 8 of 10 sites in non-Kurdish Iraq exhibit a pattern of
increased mortality.
These data help explain the large confidence intervals (mentioned
above) around the mortality estimates. Most likely a major reason the
confidence intervals are so large is the inclusion of the Kurdish
region and the reversed pattern in Sulaymaniya. It would have been
reasonable to have analyzed the data for non-Kurdish Iraq separately,
which would undoubtedly have resulted in a higher estimated relative
risk and confidence intervals for estimated deaths with a
considerably greater lower bound (above the 8,000 reported in this
paper). The fact that the authors did not do so, as well as their
exclusion of Falluja from the excess deaths estimate, is a sign that
they were conservative in their data analysis; that is, they did not
make post hoc (knowing how they would affect the results) decisions
in order to inflate the mortality estimate.
In addition to noting that the Kurdish region is included in
analyses, it is important to examine areas of the country that were
not included. By excluding Falluja from the estimate of excess
deaths, the authors are in fact excluding all of Anbar Governorate.
Now, Anbar Governorate includes both Falluja and Ramadi, as well as
some of the areas near the Syrian border where "foreign insurgents"
are alleged to have entered Iraq. An examination of news accounts
from Iraq, or of US casualties[22] will show that a large proportion
of all fighting in Iraq occurs in Anbar, as this Governorate has been
in the forefront of fighting since the first month of the
occupation.[23] Thus, excluding this Governorate could easily lead to
a serious underestimation of Iraqi deaths.
It should also be noted that Najaf, scene of fierce fighting and
massive US bombing in April and August 2004,[24, 25] was also not
sampled (see Table 1 in the paper). Further, while the Baghdad slum
known as Sadr City, a stronghold of Moqtada al-Sadr -- and site of
furious fighting and US bombing for months -- was included in the
sample, the area sampled there "by random chance was in an unscathed
neighborhood with no reported deaths from the months of recent
clashes" (p. 7). Thus, many of the areas with the most intense
fighting were either excluded from key analyses (Falluja) or were not
sampled (Ramadi, Najaf), or while part of a sampled area did not have
their violent section sampled. This fact suggests that the mortality
rate for the country as a whole may, in fact, be far higher than the
authors estimate (the authors in fact state this possibility). In any
case, these exclusions, combined with the inclusion of the Kurdish
region with the Sulaymaniya outlier, increase the likelihood that the
rate of excess deaths is NOT near the lower level of the stated
confidence interval of 8,000.
One of the surprising findings is that, of the 61 violent deaths
attributed to Coalition forces in this study, only three involved
actions by ground forces. The other 58 deaths were attributed to
"helicopter gunships, rockets, or other forms of aerial weaponry" (p.
7). These results strongly suggest that the air war has been even
more intense than is often suggested.
On the other hand, it is possible that at least a few of these deaths
may actually be due to insurgent actions. There have been a number of
reports of Iraqis blaming American helicopters or missiles for
attacks actually carried out by insurgents.[26-28] Thus, it is
possible that not all the violent deaths attributed to Coalition
actions may be due directly to those actions. Of course, one could
still argue that the US and its allies, by invading Iraq on false
pretenses and continuing a long-term occupation of the country, bear
primary moral responsibility for deaths occurring as a consequence.
Nonetheless, one should exercise some caution in attributing all
these deaths to Coalition actions. It should, however, also be
remembered that even official statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of
Health (before the US-installed government ordered them to stop
releasing statistics on Iraqi casualties[29]) document that the
majority of reported casualties are due to Coalition actions, rather
than those of the insurgents.[30]
Conclusion
This study is an extremely well-conducted and analyzed piece of
research. Like most high-quality research, it has potential
limitations and the paper's Discussion section details possible
interferences with the accuracy of the results. The authors argue
convincingly that none of these limitations invalidate their basic
findings of high excess deaths following the invasion and occupation
of Iraq. In fact, they argue, based on arguments somewhat different
from those I present here, that the real number of excess deaths may
be even higher than their 98,000 estimate.
> coolcalmcollected schrieb am 14. April 2005 9:08
>
> > > Auch gilt: Je brutaler ein (für westliche Wirtschaftsinteressen)
> > > passendes Regime seine Bevölkerung traktiert, umso höher fällt die
> > > Unterstützung durch Staaten wie die USA aus (...)
> > >
> > > Wenn die Beseitigung einer Dikatatur aus dem Volk heraus passiert,
> > > verläuft es vergleichsweise unblutig. Siehe Ceaucescu in Rumänien (der
> > > übrigens ebenfalls von den USA unterstützt wurde).
>
> Rumänien war ein Teil des soz. Lagers. Wenn irgendwer etwas in dem
> Land zu verantworten hat, sind es die kommunistischen Machthaber.
Ja? Ceausescu war beispielsweise beim ehemaligen US-amerikanischen
Verteidigungsminister McNamara (der wesentlich an der Terrorkampagne
der USA gegen Kuba zur Amtszeit Kennedys beteiligt war) so beliebt,
dass er ihn begeistert mit Milliarden Dollar unterstützt hat.
McNamara hatte wohl erkannt, das der rumänische Diktator aus dem
gleichen Holz geschnitzt war wie die anderen brutalen "Darlings" der
US-Außenpolitik: Duvalier, Marcos, Mobuto, Saddam Hussein, usw. usf:
http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn03012004.html
"The managerial ideal for McNamara was managerial dictatorship. World
Bank loans surged to Pinochet's Chile after Allende's overthrow, to
Uruguay, to Argentina, to Brazil after the military coup, to the
Philippines, to Suharto after the '65 coup in Indonesia.
And to the Romania of Ceausescu. McNamara poured money--$2.36 billion
between 1974 and 1982--into the tyrant's hands. In 1980 Romania was
the Bank's eighth biggest borrower. As McNamara crowed delightedly
about his "faith in the financial morality of socialist countries"
Ceausescu razed whole villages, turned hundreds of square miles of
prime farm land into open- pit mines, polluted the air with coal and
lignite, turned Rumania into one vast prison, applauded by the Bank
in an amazing 1979 economic study as being a fine advertisement for
the "Importance of Centralized Economic Control".
Another section of that same 1979 report, titled "Development of
Human Resources", featured these chilling words: "To improve the
standards of living of the population as a beneficiary of the
development process, the government has pursued policies to make
better use of the population as a factor of production... An
essential feature of the overall manpower policy has been ... to
stimulate an increase in birth rates." Ceausescu forbade abortions,
and cut off disrtribution of contraceptives. Result: ten of thousand
of abandoned children, dumped in orphanages, another sacrificial
hecatomb in McNamara's lethal hubris."
> > Tote durch den Überfall der USA und GB, beginnend März 2003:
> > Vermutlich weit über 100.000 tote Iraker.
>
> Pure Spekulation! Eine rein statistische Analyse. Wenn du schon gern
> mit Zahlen jonglierst dann nimm diese, da verschwindet sofort eine
> Null.
> http://www.iraqbodycount.net/database/
> Die Zahen liegen zwische 17 000 und 20 000!
Nein. Ich vertraue der Studie, bei der irakische Haushalte
tatsächlich befragt wurden. Das ist zuverlässiger und man kommt zu
wesentlich stichhaltigeren Ergebnissen:
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=6565
"100,000 Iraqis Dead: Should We Believe It?
(...)
So let's examine the data in this article. Of course, we don't have
the raw data in the researchers' computers. But we do have the wealth
of data they present in the article. These data go considerably
beyond the estimates of relative risk and excess mortality.
One issue to examine is: are the deaths localized in one cluster that
may be atypical of the country as a whole? Of course, the death rate
in Falluja was far higher than that for the rest of the country.
(More on this below). The authors provide information on the
distribution of deaths in their Figure 1, which illustrated the pre-
and post-invasion death rates in the randomly selected clusters in 11
of Iraq's Governorates. One of these Governorates is Falluja, with
mortality rates over 10 times higher than the rest of the country.
For another Governorate, Sulaymaniya, the post-invasion rate was
considerably lower than the pre-invasion rate, while for two others,
Karbala and Ninawa, the rates were essentially equal. Now,
Sulaymaniya is in the Kurdish north of the country, under the firm
control of the Kurdistan Regional Government, where there is no
insurgency and no Coalition attacks. The other seven Governorates all
exhibit considerable increases in mortality rates post-invasion.
Thus, 8 of 10 sites in non-Kurdish Iraq exhibit a pattern of
increased mortality.
These data help explain the large confidence intervals (mentioned
above) around the mortality estimates. Most likely a major reason the
confidence intervals are so large is the inclusion of the Kurdish
region and the reversed pattern in Sulaymaniya. It would have been
reasonable to have analyzed the data for non-Kurdish Iraq separately,
which would undoubtedly have resulted in a higher estimated relative
risk and confidence intervals for estimated deaths with a
considerably greater lower bound (above the 8,000 reported in this
paper). The fact that the authors did not do so, as well as their
exclusion of Falluja from the excess deaths estimate, is a sign that
they were conservative in their data analysis; that is, they did not
make post hoc (knowing how they would affect the results) decisions
in order to inflate the mortality estimate.
In addition to noting that the Kurdish region is included in
analyses, it is important to examine areas of the country that were
not included. By excluding Falluja from the estimate of excess
deaths, the authors are in fact excluding all of Anbar Governorate.
Now, Anbar Governorate includes both Falluja and Ramadi, as well as
some of the areas near the Syrian border where "foreign insurgents"
are alleged to have entered Iraq. An examination of news accounts
from Iraq, or of US casualties[22] will show that a large proportion
of all fighting in Iraq occurs in Anbar, as this Governorate has been
in the forefront of fighting since the first month of the
occupation.[23] Thus, excluding this Governorate could easily lead to
a serious underestimation of Iraqi deaths.
It should also be noted that Najaf, scene of fierce fighting and
massive US bombing in April and August 2004,[24, 25] was also not
sampled (see Table 1 in the paper). Further, while the Baghdad slum
known as Sadr City, a stronghold of Moqtada al-Sadr -- and site of
furious fighting and US bombing for months -- was included in the
sample, the area sampled there "by random chance was in an unscathed
neighborhood with no reported deaths from the months of recent
clashes" (p. 7). Thus, many of the areas with the most intense
fighting were either excluded from key analyses (Falluja) or were not
sampled (Ramadi, Najaf), or while part of a sampled area did not have
their violent section sampled. This fact suggests that the mortality
rate for the country as a whole may, in fact, be far higher than the
authors estimate (the authors in fact state this possibility). In any
case, these exclusions, combined with the inclusion of the Kurdish
region with the Sulaymaniya outlier, increase the likelihood that the
rate of excess deaths is NOT near the lower level of the stated
confidence interval of 8,000.
One of the surprising findings is that, of the 61 violent deaths
attributed to Coalition forces in this study, only three involved
actions by ground forces. The other 58 deaths were attributed to
"helicopter gunships, rockets, or other forms of aerial weaponry" (p.
7). These results strongly suggest that the air war has been even
more intense than is often suggested.
On the other hand, it is possible that at least a few of these deaths
may actually be due to insurgent actions. There have been a number of
reports of Iraqis blaming American helicopters or missiles for
attacks actually carried out by insurgents.[26-28] Thus, it is
possible that not all the violent deaths attributed to Coalition
actions may be due directly to those actions. Of course, one could
still argue that the US and its allies, by invading Iraq on false
pretenses and continuing a long-term occupation of the country, bear
primary moral responsibility for deaths occurring as a consequence.
Nonetheless, one should exercise some caution in attributing all
these deaths to Coalition actions. It should, however, also be
remembered that even official statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of
Health (before the US-installed government ordered them to stop
releasing statistics on Iraqi casualties[29]) document that the
majority of reported casualties are due to Coalition actions, rather
than those of the insurgents.[30]
Conclusion
This study is an extremely well-conducted and analyzed piece of
research. Like most high-quality research, it has potential
limitations and the paper's Discussion section details possible
interferences with the accuracy of the results. The authors argue
convincingly that none of these limitations invalidate their basic
findings of high excess deaths following the invasion and occupation
of Iraq. In fact, they argue, based on arguments somewhat different
from those I present here, that the real number of excess deaths may
be even higher than their 98,000 estimate.