Colin Powell zeigte ja vor der UN diese Aluminimum Röhren u.a., als
Beweis das Saddam ein Atom Waffen Programm hat.
Das war genauso gelogen wie die Raketen von Westerwelle, welche bis
München fliegen. Punkt!
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2003, Issue No. 106
December 9, 2003
** MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES
** ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A TIME OF CRISIS
** NAVY MEMO ON FISA
** CRS ON TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
** SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS
MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES
The discovery three years ago that Iraq was seeking to
procure thousands of aluminum tubes was promptly interpreted
by the Central Intelligence Agency as a sign that Saddam
Hussein was pursuing uranium enrichment centrifuge
technology for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons
program.
That assessment, leaked to the press and uncritically
reported, helped bolster the Bush Administration case for
war against Iraq.
But now all indications are that the CIA assessment was
wrong, according to David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who
has authored a detailed review of the aluminum tube
controversy.
"Since the fall of Baghdad last spring, no evidence has
emerged that Iraq planned to use the aluminum tubes in
centrifuges. Despite months of searching, the Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG) has not found any link between the tubes and a
gas centrifuge program," Albright wrote.
Albright traces the development of the aluminum tube story
from its earliest beginnings to the latest equivocations on
the matter by David Kay of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group.
Among other lessons learned, Albright notes that the National
Intelligence Estimate process proved to be a poor instrument
for adjudicating the significance of the aluminum tubes.
Crucially, of the ten or so intelligence agencies that each
had one vote on the Estimate, those with technical expertise
in centrifuge technology were outnumbered by those without
such expertise.
At a time when intelligence oversight has moved entirely
behind closed doors and is effectively dormant, Albright's
review significantly enriches the public record on this
controversial matter.
See "Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction" by
David Albright, Institute for Science and International
Security, December 5:
http://tinyurl.com/yfr8
The most damning thing one could say about an intelligence
agency is not that it sometimes makes mistakes in analysis,
which is inevitable, but that it refuses to admit its
mistakes. When an agency cannot admit error, it cannot
learn from its own missteps and is doomed to mediocrity.
In a recent publication, Stuart Cohen, Vice Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, finds no reason to
acknowledge a single flaw in U.S. intelligence on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. It is the critics, he says,
who have it wrong.
See "Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft
Myths" by Stuart Cohen, November 28:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/11/cia112803.html
But whether CIA admits it or not, the Agency is already
paying a price in credibility for having acquiesced in
overstating the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
So when the CIA issues an assessment on North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, for example, it is now roundly met with
skepticism by national security experts, as the Los Angeles
Times reported today.
See "N. Korea's Nuclear Success Is Doubted" by Douglas
Frantz, Los Angeles Times, December 9:
http://tinyurl.com/yfqm
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A TIME OF CRISIS
The challenges posed to academic freedom and free inquiry by
the post-September 11 security environment are discussed in
a new report from the American Association of University
Professors.
"A major section of the report is devoted to restrictions on
information. It reviews the evolution of federal regulation
of classified research and the persistent uncertainty about
the extent and location of such research within the academic
world. The report recognizes the limited circumstances
under which such restrictions may be warranted but points
out that secret research is fundamentally at odds with the
free circulation of research results. The report expresses
reservations about the expansion of such constraints in
response to national security concerns."
See "Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of
Crisis," report of an AAUP Special Committee:
http://www.aaup.org/statements/REPORTS/911report.htm
NAVY MEMO ON FISA
The impact of the USA Patriot Act on the search and
surveillance procedures of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) is discussed in a September 2003
memo from the Navy's Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General. See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/navy0903.pdf
CRS ON TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
A report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
dispassionately considers whether terrorists might use
chemical and biological weapons, and why (or why not).
See "Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological
Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context" by Audrey Kurth
Cronin, March 28, 2003:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf
Congressional leaders refuse to provide comprehensive online
public access to CRS products like this one. Rep. Bob Ney
(R-OH), chair of the House Committee on House
Administration, told the Associated Press on Monday that he
would oppose a bill to require routine publication of CRS
reports. Members of the public will have to turn elsewhere.
SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS
If you have learned something useful, valuable or interesting
from Secrecy News over the past year, then please consider
supporting this publication and the work of the FAS Project
on Government Secrecy.
Tax-deductible donations may be made online here (click
"donate now" and make sure to designate your contribution
for "project on government secrecy"):
http://www.guidestar.org/helping/donate.adp?ein=23-7185827
Beweis das Saddam ein Atom Waffen Programm hat.
Das war genauso gelogen wie die Raketen von Westerwelle, welche bis
München fliegen. Punkt!
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2003, Issue No. 106
December 9, 2003
** MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES
** ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A TIME OF CRISIS
** NAVY MEMO ON FISA
** CRS ON TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
** SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS
MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ'S ALUMINUM TUBES
The discovery three years ago that Iraq was seeking to
procure thousands of aluminum tubes was promptly interpreted
by the Central Intelligence Agency as a sign that Saddam
Hussein was pursuing uranium enrichment centrifuge
technology for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons
program.
That assessment, leaked to the press and uncritically
reported, helped bolster the Bush Administration case for
war against Iraq.
But now all indications are that the CIA assessment was
wrong, according to David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who
has authored a detailed review of the aluminum tube
controversy.
"Since the fall of Baghdad last spring, no evidence has
emerged that Iraq planned to use the aluminum tubes in
centrifuges. Despite months of searching, the Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG) has not found any link between the tubes and a
gas centrifuge program," Albright wrote.
Albright traces the development of the aluminum tube story
from its earliest beginnings to the latest equivocations on
the matter by David Kay of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group.
Among other lessons learned, Albright notes that the National
Intelligence Estimate process proved to be a poor instrument
for adjudicating the significance of the aluminum tubes.
Crucially, of the ten or so intelligence agencies that each
had one vote on the Estimate, those with technical expertise
in centrifuge technology were outnumbered by those without
such expertise.
At a time when intelligence oversight has moved entirely
behind closed doors and is effectively dormant, Albright's
review significantly enriches the public record on this
controversial matter.
See "Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction" by
David Albright, Institute for Science and International
Security, December 5:
http://tinyurl.com/yfr8
The most damning thing one could say about an intelligence
agency is not that it sometimes makes mistakes in analysis,
which is inevitable, but that it refuses to admit its
mistakes. When an agency cannot admit error, it cannot
learn from its own missteps and is doomed to mediocrity.
In a recent publication, Stuart Cohen, Vice Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, finds no reason to
acknowledge a single flaw in U.S. intelligence on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. It is the critics, he says,
who have it wrong.
See "Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft
Myths" by Stuart Cohen, November 28:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/11/cia112803.html
But whether CIA admits it or not, the Agency is already
paying a price in credibility for having acquiesced in
overstating the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
So when the CIA issues an assessment on North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, for example, it is now roundly met with
skepticism by national security experts, as the Los Angeles
Times reported today.
See "N. Korea's Nuclear Success Is Doubted" by Douglas
Frantz, Los Angeles Times, December 9:
http://tinyurl.com/yfqm
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A TIME OF CRISIS
The challenges posed to academic freedom and free inquiry by
the post-September 11 security environment are discussed in
a new report from the American Association of University
Professors.
"A major section of the report is devoted to restrictions on
information. It reviews the evolution of federal regulation
of classified research and the persistent uncertainty about
the extent and location of such research within the academic
world. The report recognizes the limited circumstances
under which such restrictions may be warranted but points
out that secret research is fundamentally at odds with the
free circulation of research results. The report expresses
reservations about the expansion of such constraints in
response to national security concerns."
See "Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of
Crisis," report of an AAUP Special Committee:
http://www.aaup.org/statements/REPORTS/911report.htm
NAVY MEMO ON FISA
The impact of the USA Patriot Act on the search and
surveillance procedures of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) is discussed in a September 2003
memo from the Navy's Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General. See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/navy0903.pdf
CRS ON TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
A report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
dispassionately considers whether terrorists might use
chemical and biological weapons, and why (or why not).
See "Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological
Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context" by Audrey Kurth
Cronin, March 28, 2003:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf
Congressional leaders refuse to provide comprehensive online
public access to CRS products like this one. Rep. Bob Ney
(R-OH), chair of the House Committee on House
Administration, told the Associated Press on Monday that he
would oppose a bill to require routine publication of CRS
reports. Members of the public will have to turn elsewhere.
SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS
If you have learned something useful, valuable or interesting
from Secrecy News over the past year, then please consider
supporting this publication and the work of the FAS Project
on Government Secrecy.
Tax-deductible donations may be made online here (click
"donate now" and make sure to designate your contribution
for "project on government secrecy"):
http://www.guidestar.org/helping/donate.adp?ein=23-7185827