pepiBican schrieb am 26.10.2023 18:54:
ich empfehle solche Postings vorher doch zu überdenken.
Die SWP Berlin schreibt zum Thema ultra-orthodoxer Juden in Israel:
Since the early 2000s, a domestic confrontation (which has accompanied the state since its foundation) has intensified: the fight over the identity of Israel. Especially among Jewish Israelis, a “culture war” has developed, which gains trenchancy from the way in which normative questions are quickly linked to fundamental debates over the identity of the state. President Reuven Rivlin views this in the context of the emergence of a “new Israeli order”: for him, secular Zionism has lost its cohesive power, and Israel’s four “tribes” – secular and religious Zionists, Israeli Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox – are therefore negotiating a new social order. The focal point of these debates continues to be the meaning of Israel as a “Jewish state”.
The ultra-Orthodox or Haredim have a special role in these confrontations: within Israel’s already deeply divided society, they are the only Jewish movement that is not based on Zionism. They view themselves as non-modern, traditional Jews who represent authentic Jewishness.
This leads to tensions with both the state and mainstream society. On the one hand, the Haredim consider the state a threat to their identity. On the other hand, it serves them, as it does their Jewish fellow citizens, as a screen onto which to project their worldview. This has been evident in the political sphere particularly since the turn of the millennium,
when confrontations over the special rights of the Haredim – such as their exemption from military service, and their educational autonomy – began to occupy the courts and enter into election campaigns. Simultaneously, the Haredim have steadily been driving out religious Zionists from their role as “preservers of the Jewish identity of the state”. Instead, the Haredim now try to entrench their own understanding of religious orthodox principles within the state.This aspiration to shape affairs is new and turns the Haredim into exposed actors in a culture war that is not exclusively about them, but that is, often, about their influence and status within the state. This is particularly significant because the Ultra-Orthodox share of the Israeli population is rising disproportionately since they traditionally have large families: from four percent in 1980 to 12 percent today. By 2040 it is expected to grow to over 20 percent.
What do these developments mean for Israel? How are the Haredim changing politics, the economy and society, and what goals do they set themselves? What specifically do these confrontations concerning the identity of the state revolve around? What are the limits of ultra-Orthodox politics? And how is the growing importance of the Haredim within the state changing their community?
Three areas of conflict are particularly relevant within this process of negotiation. First, the Jewish identity of the state, the new self-image of the Haredim, and the active shaping of the state by their political parties. This shaping consists inter alia of preventing or neutralising any form of normative (and especially liberal) constitution of the state or its key institutions that runs counter to the Haredi perspective. Here, the Haredim focus on pushing back the substantive liberal aspects of Israeli democracy in favour of a procedural democracy without normative basis. They also claim the prerogative to interpret the relationship between religion and state. This can be seen in their efforts to pre-empt any liberalisation or secularisation, and also their continuous attempt to push through their own convictions – for instance as concerns resting on the Shabbat or the question of who is recognised as a Jew in Israel.
The second area of conflict is the special rights of the Haredim community. A large part of the Israeli population criticises the privileged treatment they receive at the expense of the majority. This particularly concerns their exemption from military service and the state subsidies for about 50 percent of ultra-Orthodox adult males who are not engaged in paid work because of their Torah studies. For the Haredim, these are key elements of their milieu that must be protected against state intervention. The conflicts arising from this have repeatedly led to coalition crises or even new elections, but they also relate to the culture war and the associated question of which norms the state should use to set its priorities.
The third area of conflict is primarily extra-parliamentary and concerns issues of public normativity. When Haredim move into non-ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods, this often leads to the inhabitants being pushed out and changes the function of public spaces – for instance when leisure facilities are replaced by religious facilities. Furthermore, there are confrontations over the restrictive rules within the ultra-Orthodox community regarding women, which are forced out of the public sphere in Haredim-dominated areas.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-haredim-as-a-challenge-for-the-jewish-state
Und in einem Meinungsbeitrag von Dan Perry in der Jerusalem Post kann man folgendes lesen
As we know, the haredim cling to a rigid interpretation of Judaism which tolerates little deviation from ancient traditions. They can be found in the US, Belgium, Britain and elsewhere, always forming tight-knit communities, but only in Israel is there a toxic firewall between them and fellow citizens.
This can be traced to the decision some 70 years ago by David Ben-Gurion to grant draft exemptions to students at yeshivot. Back then this applied to several hundred genuine scholars.
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This arrangement turned Torah study into an arguably unprecedented obsession in which all haredi men are pushed to lifelong seminary duty, first to avoid the draft and then essentially as a source of welfare. Whereas other university students pay tuition, haredim receive stipends for as long as they study, if possible for life. Over 150,000 men now in these schools are indoctrinated in the faith that stricture and rabbis supersede the laws and officials of the state.
To maintain the insularity, most haredi high schoolers are sent to the community’s schools that teach little or no math, science and English; in recent days Israel’s chief rabbi, who is haredi, called such studies of secular subjects “nonsense.” Israel funds these schools even though their unfortunate graduates are essentially unemployable in a modern economy.As a consequence less than half of haredi men are part of the workforce, the lowest participation level of any identifiable group in Israel – and, tellingly, far less than haredim in other countries. The minority who do work tend to populate a vast religious bureaucracy that includes supervisors of the mikvaot ritual baths, kashrut food certifications, and other apparatchiks.
Women in the community are banished from haredi parties’ candidates lists and encouraged to procreate with such vigor that they on average produce 7.1 children – far more than in any identifiable group in Israel. They live in a poverty rendered minimally tolerable by state subsidies for each child at the expense of working Israelis. Thus the community doubles itself every 16 years, four times the rate of the rest of Israel. The haredim have grown to about 12% of the 9.5 million people – almost 20% of the country’s Jews. Unless something changes – and the attrition rate is estimated at less than 5% – they will constitute a majority of Israel’s Jews in a few decades.
https://m.jpost.com/opinion/haredim-not-arabs-or-iran-are-the-biggest-threat-to-israel-opinion-672968