DasWoelfchen schrieb am 04.02.2024 17:26:
FIAE-Flix schrieb am 04.02.2024 16:24:
Auf der gleichen Seite gab es übrigens damals reichlich Bilder von Militärfahrzeugen auf Seiten der Separatisten, über die damals nur die russische Armee verfügte.
Es gab aber schon 2014 reichlich Berichte darüber, dass reguläre ukrainische Truppen überliefen oder entsprechendes Militärgerät von den Separatisten "konfisziert" wurde:
Klar gab es auch übergelaufene Armeeeinheiten, aber woher kam die Ausrüstung, die nicht von der ukrainischen Armee benutzt wurde? Und woher die russischen Soldaten?
Mark Galeotti: Putin’s Wars. From Chechnya to Ukraine. Osprey, 2022, ISBN 978-1-4728-4755-3, S. 188, https://books.google.de/books?id=yvRfEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT154:
In August 2014, the Russians deployed an estimated 3,500–6,500 troops into Ukraine, growing to a peak of some 10,000 by the end of the year. There had already been small detachments from the 2nd and 10th Spetsnaz Brigades, the 106th Guards Airborne Division and the 45th Guards Airborne Spetsnaz Regiment. Then, elements of the 9th and 18th Motor Rifle Brigades were deployed to prepare the ground. The first wave of regular combat forces saw the introduction of Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) drawn from fully ten manoeuvre units: the 17th, 18th, 21st and 33rd Motor Rifle Brigades, the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, the 104th and 247th Air-Assault Regiments and the 137th and 331st Airborne Regiments. At this point, the age of so-called ‘hybrid war’, one in which disinformation, deniable political operations and other non-kinetic means are at least as important as the actual fighting on the battlefield, was virtually over. Instead this was looking much more like a conventional, even if undeclared, war in which both sides fielded mixes of regular forces and militias in sporadic, but brutal conflict.