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856 Beiträge seit 01.12.2020

Re: Wenn Schulenberg Recht hat, muss Lawrow ein Lügner sein

schaunmermal schrieb am 11.05.2024 06:30:

Qielle für die behaupteten regulären Truppen in 2014?

Jakob Hauter: Russia’s Overlooked Invasion. The Causes of the 2014 Outbreak of War in Ukraine’s Donbas. Ibidem-Verlag, 2023, ISBN 978-3-8382-1803-8, S. 247:
"Chapter nine has shown that the involvement of Russia’s regular armed forces was decisive in the final critical juncture in the conflict’s initial escalation sequence. This critical juncture was of particular importance because it paved the way for the static, low-level violence that continued in the Donbas in the years that followed. After cross-border shelling had slowed the Ukrainian advance throughout July and August, Ukrainian forces were decisively defeated in three battles at the end of August. They had to abandon the siege of Luhansk, lost control over all areas southeast of Donetsk, and faced a new enemy offensive along the southern coast. In all three cases, there is convincing evidence of the involvement of "Russian regular forces."

Dominique Arel, Jesse Driscoll: Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge University Press, 2023, ISBN 978-1-00-905292-4, S. 168–169, https://books.google.de/books?id=7dWgEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA168:
"Russia began its direct military intervention on August 25 (2014). The Russian army crossed the Southern border near Mariupol. (…) Newly arrived Russian soldiers and their advanced weaponry quickly overwhelmed and routed the Ukrainian troops. There were over 300 casualties. Ukrainian fighters may have been hit by missiles from across the Russian border. Multiple sources – witnesses from the international media, military analysts, geolocated pictures, satellite imagery – pointed to the presence of Russian soldiers near Ilovaisk, and other locations in Donbas. Ukrainian forces captured nineteen active-duty Russian soldiers. Up until the February 2022 war, Russia still denied military involvement."

Paul D’Anieri: Ukraine and Russia. From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press, 2023, ISBN 978-1-00-931554-8, S. 236–237, https://books.google.de/books?id=ASysEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA236:
"On August 20, Ukrainian government and paramilitary forces seized Ilovaisk, between the city of Donetsk and the Russian border, as part of an effort to separate Donetsk and Luhansk separatist forces and to disrupt supply lines. The Ukrainian government believed it was on the verge of a decisive victory, and apparently the Russian government agreed. An insurgent counterattack was bolstered by the entry into the conflict of regular Russian army forces crossing the nearby border. The Russian forces, well equipped and trained and with superior command, control, and intelligence, encircled a large group of Ukrainian forces. An attempt to relieve them was repulsed by Russian forces, and the Ukrainian forces were then routed, with many being taken prisoner."

Serhii Plokhy: Der Angriff: Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und seine Folgen für die Welt. Hoffmann und Campe, 2023, ISBN 978-3-455-01588-1, S. 175, https://books.google.de/books?id=UuKYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT112:
"Russlands offene Invasion in der Ostukraine begann am 24. August 2014, dem ukrainischen Unabhängigkeitstag, keine zehn Tage nach Girkins Abberufung. Hunderte russische Kampf- und Transportpanzer, Artilleriegeschütze und Lastwagen sowie Tausende reguläre Soldaten überquerten die ukrainische Grenze an mehreren Stellen."

Mark Galeotti: Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. Osprey, 2022, ISBN 978-1-4728-4755-3, S. 188–189, https://books.google.de/books?id=yvRfEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT154:
"In August 2014, the Russians deployed an estimated 3,500–6,500 troops into Ukraine, growing to a peak of some 10,000 by the end of the year."

Anna Arutunyan: Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow's Struggle for Ukraine. Hurst & Company, 2022, ISBN 978-1-78738-795-9, S. 168, https://books.google.de/books?id=33KMEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT186:
"On 15 August, DPR leader Zakharchenko announced the “joyful news” that a substantial reinforcement had arrived from Russia, consisting of at least 150 armored vehicles, thirty tanks and, most important, 1,200 servicemen “who had undergone training in Russia.”8 Less than a week later, Ukraine’s Security Council would announce the capture of those Russian armed vehicles manned by Russian soldiers, including Ilya Maksimov. And on 25 August, Ukraine’s Security Service captured ten soldiers who were part of an airborne battalion dislocated to Rostov and then ordered to march into Ukraine along with a column of infantry fighting vehicles. This was the first time that irrefutable, documented evidence had appeared of regular Russian troops in Donbas. Moscow, however, began not only denying its military involvement, but disavowing its own soldiers."

Hannes Adomeit: Russlands subversive Kriegsführung in der Ukraine. In: SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen. Jg. 4, Nr. 2, Juni 2020, https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2020-2009:
"Reguläre russische Streitkräfte, darin sind sich alle ernst zu nehmenden Analysten einig, sind allerdings eingesetzt worden, und zwar immer dann, wenn es für die separatistischen Milizionäre kritisch wurde. Dies war insbesondere in Ilovajsk im August 2014 und in Debalceve im Februar 2015 der Fall."

https://www.4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-Eng.pdf

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/HPS_German.pdf

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