Re: 2 Plus 4 Vertrag - Memo US-Aussenminister Baker

US Aussenminister Baker hatte dieselbe Zusage gemacht, als Basis für die Verhandlungen im Zwei Plus 4 Format.

Anbei das etwas formatierte OCR des inzwischen freigegeben Memos von US-Aussenminister Baker, was Gorbatschow zugesagt wurde:

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[...]
Gorbachev: I say four plus two; you say two plus four. How do you look at this formula ?

Baker: Two plus four is a better way. I have explained to Eduard that the four power mechanism alone cannot work. CSCE is too unwieldy to work. I don't know if the Germans agree with two plus four. But the point is when one approaches the external aspects of_German unification you have to take into account Germany's neighbors. It is conceivable that the 35 could be used to ratify an agreement reached through the two plus four mechanism. We fought a war together to bring peace to Europe. We didn't do so well handling the peace in the Cold War. And now we are faced with rapid and fundamental change. And we are in a better position to cooperate in preserving peace .I want you to know one thing for certain The President and I have made clear that we seek no unilateral advantage in this process .

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I have got one or two other points We don't favorably view a neutral Germany. The FRG says that this is not a satisfactory approach. A neutral Germany in our view is not necessarily going to be a non-militaristic Germany. It could well decide that it needed its own independent nuclear capability as opposed to depending on the deterrent of the United States. All our allies and East Europeans we have spoken to have told us that they want us to maintain a presence in Europe. I am not sure whether you favor that or not. But let me say that if our allies want us to go we will be gone in a minute. Indeed, if they want us to leave we'll go and I can assure you that the sentiment of the American people is such that they will want us to leave immediately. The mechanism by which we have a US military presence in Europe is NATO. If you abolish NATO, there will be no more Us presence.

We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part Of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east. At the end of the day, if it is acceptable to everyone, we could have discussions in a two plus four context that might achieve this kind of an outcome. Maybe there is a better way to deal with the external consequences of German unification. And if there is I am not aware of it. We don't have German agreement but we have mentioned it to Genscher and he said he wants to think about it. Dumas liked it and now I have mentioned it to you.

Gorbachev: Basically, I share the course of your thinking. The process is underway. We have to adjust this process. We have to adjust this new reality and not be passive in ensuring that stability in Europe is not upset. Well for us and for you regardless of the differences there is nothing terrifying in the prospect of a unified Germany. But this is simplistic. First of all, we both are interested in improving European conditions and we can't simply stand by. Now what kind of Germany are we going to face in the future How can it be included in world structures?

Second there are different perspectives in London, Paris, Budapest and Warsaw. Yesterday I had a talk with Jaruzelski. He knows that you are here today and Kohl and Genscher will be here tomorrow. Given that, he wants to call and talk. The German question is the key question for him It is critical to the Poles.

Baker: That's right

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Gorbachev: [ ..geschwärzt...] For France and for Britain the question is whose going to be the major player in Europe. We have it easier we are big countries and have our own weight. We also see how Kohl and his team are talking to us – very carefully knowing what our two countries mean. So it is important to channel this process, while recognizing the sensitivities, and being tactful. So the mechanism of four plus two or two plus four, assuming it relies on an international legal basis, is suitable for the situation. Maybe after this exchange, not because we agree on all the details, we should continue exchanges with our two friends. We have spoken to Modrow and I-will talk to Kohl tomorrow .

Baker: That will be good if you did. One note of caution. If there is a chance to convince the Germans we must talk about this process starting only after March 18, only after self determination of GDR is carried out, and only after the internal aspects of unification are being discussed by the Germans. Otherwise the Germans will not go for it. They will say-the question of German unification is a German question. What we say is: The internal aspects are for the two Germanies - to determine. The external aspect has to be accomplished with due regard to Germany's neighbors. Their security concerns will have to be taken into account and questions like the status of Berlin will have to be resolved. I believe there is some chance Of agreement. I have not had a discussion on this directly with the Chancellor, but my impression of Genscher's reaction is that he thinks it's a good approach. Of course the Chancellor is running for election .

Gorbachev: Yes That affects the whole process .

Baker: He'll be very careful not to be seen as turning over to others the question of unification.

Gorbachev: [ ..geschwärzt…]

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[ ..geschwärzt…]
We shouldn t stop our thinking about how to channel the current events and the unification process. Let's be sure that we recognize realistic forces and take them into account. So please tell the President that we should keep very closely in'touch on this whole question of German unification.

Baker: I will. But please understand that I am not suggesting that we should succumb to the emotional drive for unification. What I am saying however, is that the process of unification is not going to be stopped and we have it as a duty to our people, peace, and the world more generally to do what we can to shape the external aspects of unification in a way that enhances stability. That's why I have suggested this two plus four mechanism. I am sure that unification will cost the FRG a lot. I am sure as well that the issue is going to be a prominent one in the election campaign in Germany. But, whatever potential problems exist are going to overwhelmed by

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the emotional desire of the Germans to get together and that's the reality that we deal with. I'd like to pose a question and you need not answer it . Let's assume for the moment that unification is going to take place. Assuming that, would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO's current jurisdiction eastward ?
[ ... geschwärzt]
B1

Gorbatschev: [ ..geschwärzt...] Let me say that the approach you have outlined is... a very possible one. We don't really want to see a replay of Versailles, where the Germans were able to arm themselves.
[geschwärzt]
The best way to constrain that process is to ensure that Germany is contained within European structures. What you have said to me about your approach and your preference is very realistic. So let's think about that But don't ask me to give you a bottom line right now. [ ..geschwärzt…] Let's move to Afghanistan[...]

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16116-document-05-memorandum-conversation-between
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/16116/ocr

Edit: Satzzeichen nachbearbeitet.