Die Codes, die den unberechtigten Abschuß von Interkontinentalraketen
durch das Militär verhindern sollten, lauteten sämtlich "00000000",
und alle Offiziere in den Raketensilos wußten dies.
http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm
"Last month I asked Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, what he believed back in the
1960s was the status of technical locks on the Minuteman
intercontinental missiles. These long-range nuclear-tipped missiles
first came on line during the Cuban missile crisis and grew to a
force of 1,000 during the McNamara years — the backbone of the U.S.
strategic deterrent through the late 1960s. McNamara replied, in his
trade-mark, assertively confident manner that he personally saw to it
that these special locks (known to wonks as “Permissive Action
Links”) were installed on the Minuteman force, and that he regarded
them as essential to strict central control and preventing
unauthorized launch.
When the history of the nuclear cold war is finally comprehensively
written, this McNamara vignette will be one of a long litany of items
pointing to the ignorance of presidents and defense secretaries and
other nuclear security officials about the true state of nuclear
affairs during their time in the saddle. What I then told McNamara
about his vitally important locks elicited this response: “I am
shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Who the hell authorized
that?” What he had just learned from me was that the locks had been
installed, but everyone knew the combination.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the
“locks” to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard. During
the early to mid-1970s, during my stint as a Minuteman launch
officer, they still had not been changed. Our launch checklist in
fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking
panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other
than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel. SAC remained
far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the
potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of
wartime launch orders. And so the “secret unlock code” during the
height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at
OOOOOOOO.
After leaving the Air Force in 1974, I pressed the service, initially
by letters addressed to it and then through congressional
intermediaries, to consider a range of terrorist scenarios in which
these locks could serve as crucial barriers against the unauthorized
seizure of launch control over Minuteman missiles. In 1977, I
co-authored (with Garry Brewer) an article (click here to view)
entitled “The Terrorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs” in which I
laid out the case for taking this threat more seriously and
suggesting remedial measures including, first and foremost,
activating those McNamara locks that apparently he and presidents
presumed had already been activated.
The locks were activated in 1977."
durch das Militär verhindern sollten, lauteten sämtlich "00000000",
und alle Offiziere in den Raketensilos wußten dies.
http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm
"Last month I asked Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, what he believed back in the
1960s was the status of technical locks on the Minuteman
intercontinental missiles. These long-range nuclear-tipped missiles
first came on line during the Cuban missile crisis and grew to a
force of 1,000 during the McNamara years — the backbone of the U.S.
strategic deterrent through the late 1960s. McNamara replied, in his
trade-mark, assertively confident manner that he personally saw to it
that these special locks (known to wonks as “Permissive Action
Links”) were installed on the Minuteman force, and that he regarded
them as essential to strict central control and preventing
unauthorized launch.
When the history of the nuclear cold war is finally comprehensively
written, this McNamara vignette will be one of a long litany of items
pointing to the ignorance of presidents and defense secretaries and
other nuclear security officials about the true state of nuclear
affairs during their time in the saddle. What I then told McNamara
about his vitally important locks elicited this response: “I am
shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Who the hell authorized
that?” What he had just learned from me was that the locks had been
installed, but everyone knew the combination.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the
“locks” to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard. During
the early to mid-1970s, during my stint as a Minuteman launch
officer, they still had not been changed. Our launch checklist in
fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking
panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other
than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel. SAC remained
far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the
potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of
wartime launch orders. And so the “secret unlock code” during the
height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at
OOOOOOOO.
After leaving the Air Force in 1974, I pressed the service, initially
by letters addressed to it and then through congressional
intermediaries, to consider a range of terrorist scenarios in which
these locks could serve as crucial barriers against the unauthorized
seizure of launch control over Minuteman missiles. In 1977, I
co-authored (with Garry Brewer) an article (click here to view)
entitled “The Terrorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs” in which I
laid out the case for taking this threat more seriously and
suggesting remedial measures including, first and foremost,
activating those McNamara locks that apparently he and presidents
presumed had already been activated.
The locks were activated in 1977."