DasWoelfchen schrieb am 01.06.2024 13:09:
DrM schrieb am 01.06.2024 12:15:
kodu schrieb am 01.06.2024 11:48:
Ohne den „Einfluss“ des US-Außenministeriums (Stichwort: „Fuck the EU“) hätte es den Anschluss der Krim an Russland und die folgenden Ereignisse, bis hin zum aktuell nahezu täglich steigenden Eskalationslevel vermutlich gar nicht gegeben.
Das ist doch Quark.
Russland hätte sich einfach eine andere Ausrede zur Annexion der Krim und der Landbrücke zur Krim gesucht.
Was diesen Krieg zuverlässig verhindert hätte, wäre die Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine in der NATO gewesen.
Und was Herr Arestowitsch 2019 als Realität erkannt hat, war auch schon vor 2014 als die "stärkste rote Linie" für Russland hinlänglich bekannt. Dafür gibt es genug Belege in den diplomatischen Depeschen auf Wikileaks.
Die Ukraine hatte ihre Neutralität per Gesetz festgeschrieben und es gab keine Schritte in Richtung NATO-Beitritt.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine
"The biggest problem with the theory that Putin seized Crimea to stop Ukraine from joining NATO is that Ukraine was not heading toward NATO membership when Putin struck. In 2010, in large part to improve relations with Russia, the Yanukovych government had passed a law barring Ukraine from participation in any military bloc. In subsequent years, Kiev settled instead for partnership with the alliance, participating in some of its military exercises and contributing a ship to NATO antipiracy operations—an outcome that Russia seemed to accept. Indeed, when Putin, justifying the intervention in March 2014, claimed that he had “heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO,” he excluded an important detail: all the recent public statements to that effect by Ukrainian politicians had come only after Russian troops had already appeared in Crimea.
Even if Ukrainian officials had wanted to join NATO after Yanukovych’s ouster, the alliance was not about to let the country in. Putin had already won that battle at a NATO summit in 2008, when the alliance had chosen not to move forward on Ukrainian or Georgian membership. British, French, and German officials had argued that the two countries remained too unstable to be put on a path to joining the alliance and that doing so would also unnecessarily antagonize Moscow. Although NATO did not rule out Ukraine’s eventual accession, German Chancellor Angela Merkel remained opposed to practical steps in that direction, and U.S. President Barack Obama, unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, took no action to advance Kiev’s membership. What is more, in October 2013, just months before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general, announced unequivocally that Ukraine would not join the alliance in 2014. There was little reason to expect that to change anytime soon.
Of course, Putin might have believed otherwise. If that were the case, however, he would probably have raised the issue with Western leaders. He seems not to have done so, at least not with Obama, according to Michael McFaul, who served as the president’s special assistant on Russia from 2009 to 2012 and as the U.S. ambassador in Moscow from 2012 to early 2014. During that period, McFaul was present for all but one of the meetings between Obama and Putin or Dmitry Medvedev, who served as Russia’s president from 2008 to 2012; while he was serving in Washington, McFaul also listened in on all the phone conversations Obama had with either Russian leader. In a speech last year, McFaul said he couldn’t “recall once that the issue of NATO expansion came up” during any of those exchanges."
Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel: Russia and Ukraine. Entangled Histories, Diverging States. Polity Press, 2024, ISBN 978-1-5095-5737-0, S. 204:
"While immediately renewing Ukraine’s course on EU integration, the interim post-Yanukovych government initially refrained from re-affirming Ukraine’s commitment to joining NATO. In a March 18 speech, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk tried to reassure both Russia and Ukrainians in the southeast that Ukraine’s NATO bid was “not on the agenda.” This caution, as we know, did not prevent Russia’s spring military aggression against Ukraine, both in Crimea and in Donbas. By the fall, after Russia annexed Crimea and its military openly interfered in the conflict in Donbas to beat back Ukrainian forces, Yatsenyuk’s government introduced a bill to cancel Ukraine’s “non-bloc” status and to pursue NATO membership again, and in December 2014, 303 out of 450 Rada members voted for the bill. Over the next years, public support for EU and NATO membership grew significantly, reaching 56 and 45% respectively by early 2019, according to Rating Group polls. Shortly after Russia’s military buildup in the fall of 2018, which prompted Poroshenko’s partial martial law measures, the Ukrainian parliament amended the constitution to enshrine securing EU and NATO membership as the country’s goals."