Gerald2014 schrieb am 24. Januar 2016 22:22
> Man müsste endlich die UN-Charta respektieren und Waffenlieferungen
> an die nichtstaatlichen Akteure einstellen. Und das ist keine
> Träumerei wie man am Jemen sehen kann. Dort hat man ohne Probleme ein
> Waffenembargo für die nichtstaatlichen Akteure im Sicherheitsrat
> gesprochen und durchgesetzt. Die Houthis und deren Verbündeten
> Ex-Armeeeinheiten kriegen keine Waffen von Aussenmächten. Dazu hat
> man den Jemen abgeriegelt.
> Der Vergleich mit dem Jemen zeigt wie der Wertewesten von Verbrechern
> geführt wird. Die Ausrede um die UN-Charta zu brechen, Assad hätte
> tausende umgebracht, wurde durch die Waffenlieferungen um das 10 bis
> hundertfache zusätzlich verschlimmert. 300'000 Opfer hat die von den
> Freunden Syriens angetriebene Eskalation bisher gefordert. Nur zur
> Erinnerung, der letzte Aufstand der Muslimbrüder führte 1982 zu
> 30'000-40'000 Opfern.
Gemäß den am höchsten angesetzten Schätzungen. Es gab auf Global
Research einen Artikel, der das 'Massaker von Hama' dahingehend
ebenfalls bespricht:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/daraa-2011-syrias-islamist-insurrection-
in-disguise/5460547
Im wesentlichen wird sich da auf einen DIA-Bericht von 1982 sowie auf
Patrick Seales "Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East" von
1988 bezogen:
"In early 2011 Syrians were well aware of a piece of history few
western observers would remember: a strikingly similar Islamist
insurrection took place in the town of Hama, back in 1982. Yet this
was crushed within weeks by the Syrian Arab Army. Reviewing this
conflict is useful because of the myths that have grown up around
both insurrections.
US intelligence (DIA 1982) and the late British author Patrick Seale
(1988) give independent accounts of what happened at Hama. After
years of violent, sectarian attacks by Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, by
mid-1980 President Hafez al Assad had ‘broken the back’ of their
sectarian rebellion, which aimed to impose a Salafi-Islamic state.
One final coup plot was exposed and the Brotherhood ‘felt pressured
into initiating’ an uprising in their stronghold of Hama. Seale
describes the start of that violence in this way:
‘At 2am on the night of 2-3 February 1982 an army unit combing the
old city fell into an ambush. Roof top snipers killed perhaps a score
of soldiers … [Brotherhood leader] Abu Bakr [Umar Jawwad] gave the
order for a general uprising … hundreds of Islamist fighters rose …
by the morning some seventy leading Ba’athists had been slaughtered
and the triumphant guerrillas declared the city ‘liberated’ (Seale
1988: 332).
However the Army responded with a huge force of about 12,000 and the
battle raged for three weeks. It was a foreign-backed civil war, with
some defections from the army. Seale continues:
‘As the tide turned slowly in the government’s favour, the guerrillas
fell back into the old quarters … after heavy shelling, commandos and
party irregulars supported by tanks moved in … many civilians were
slaughtered in the prolonged mopping up, whole districts razed’
(Seale 1988: 333).
Two months later a US intelligence report said: ‘The total casualties
for the Hama incident probably number about 2,000. This includes an
estimated 300 to 400 members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s elite
‘Secret Apparatus’ (DIA 1982: 7). Seale recognises that the Army also
suffered heavy losses. At the same time, ‘large numbers died in the
hunt for the gunmen … government sympathizers estimating a mere 3,000
and critics as many as 20,000 … a figure of 5,000 to 10,000 could be
close to the truth’ He adds:
‘The guerrillas were formidable opponents. They had a fortune in
foreign money … [and] no fewer than 15,000 machine guns’ (Seale 1988:
335). Subsequent Muslim Brotherhood accounts have inflated the
casualties, reaching up to ‘40,000 civilians’, and attempting to hide
the vicious insurrection by claiming that Hafez al Assad had simply
carried out a ‘civilian massacre’ (e.g. Nassar 2014). The then Syrian
President blamed a large scale foreign conspiracy for the Hama
insurrection. Seale observes that Hafez was ‘not paranoical’, as many
US weapons were captured and foreign backing had come from several US
collaborators: King Hussayn of Jordan, Lebanese Christian militias
(the Israeli-aligned ‘Guardians of the Cedar’) and Saddam Hussein in
Iraq (Seale 1988: 336-337).
The Hama insurrection helps us understand the Daraa violence because,
once again in 2011, we saw armed Islamists using rooftop sniping
against police and government officials, drawing in the armed forces,
only to cry ‘civilian massacre’ when they and their collaborators
came under attack from the Army. Although the US, through its allies,
played an important part in the Hama insurrection, when it was all
over US intelligence dryly observed that: ‘the Syrians are
pragmatists who do not want a Muslim Brotherhood government’ (DIA
1982: vii)."
Zumindest der DIA-Bericht, dessen Inhalt unangenehm bekannt vorkommt
angesichts des angestifteten Kriegs in Syrien, ist dabei noch frei
verfügbar:
https://syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/dia-syria-muslimbrotherh
oodpressureintensifies-2.pdf
> Man müsste endlich die UN-Charta respektieren und Waffenlieferungen
> an die nichtstaatlichen Akteure einstellen. Und das ist keine
> Träumerei wie man am Jemen sehen kann. Dort hat man ohne Probleme ein
> Waffenembargo für die nichtstaatlichen Akteure im Sicherheitsrat
> gesprochen und durchgesetzt. Die Houthis und deren Verbündeten
> Ex-Armeeeinheiten kriegen keine Waffen von Aussenmächten. Dazu hat
> man den Jemen abgeriegelt.
> Der Vergleich mit dem Jemen zeigt wie der Wertewesten von Verbrechern
> geführt wird. Die Ausrede um die UN-Charta zu brechen, Assad hätte
> tausende umgebracht, wurde durch die Waffenlieferungen um das 10 bis
> hundertfache zusätzlich verschlimmert. 300'000 Opfer hat die von den
> Freunden Syriens angetriebene Eskalation bisher gefordert. Nur zur
> Erinnerung, der letzte Aufstand der Muslimbrüder führte 1982 zu
> 30'000-40'000 Opfern.
Gemäß den am höchsten angesetzten Schätzungen. Es gab auf Global
Research einen Artikel, der das 'Massaker von Hama' dahingehend
ebenfalls bespricht:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/daraa-2011-syrias-islamist-insurrection-
in-disguise/5460547
Im wesentlichen wird sich da auf einen DIA-Bericht von 1982 sowie auf
Patrick Seales "Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East" von
1988 bezogen:
"In early 2011 Syrians were well aware of a piece of history few
western observers would remember: a strikingly similar Islamist
insurrection took place in the town of Hama, back in 1982. Yet this
was crushed within weeks by the Syrian Arab Army. Reviewing this
conflict is useful because of the myths that have grown up around
both insurrections.
US intelligence (DIA 1982) and the late British author Patrick Seale
(1988) give independent accounts of what happened at Hama. After
years of violent, sectarian attacks by Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, by
mid-1980 President Hafez al Assad had ‘broken the back’ of their
sectarian rebellion, which aimed to impose a Salafi-Islamic state.
One final coup plot was exposed and the Brotherhood ‘felt pressured
into initiating’ an uprising in their stronghold of Hama. Seale
describes the start of that violence in this way:
‘At 2am on the night of 2-3 February 1982 an army unit combing the
old city fell into an ambush. Roof top snipers killed perhaps a score
of soldiers … [Brotherhood leader] Abu Bakr [Umar Jawwad] gave the
order for a general uprising … hundreds of Islamist fighters rose …
by the morning some seventy leading Ba’athists had been slaughtered
and the triumphant guerrillas declared the city ‘liberated’ (Seale
1988: 332).
However the Army responded with a huge force of about 12,000 and the
battle raged for three weeks. It was a foreign-backed civil war, with
some defections from the army. Seale continues:
‘As the tide turned slowly in the government’s favour, the guerrillas
fell back into the old quarters … after heavy shelling, commandos and
party irregulars supported by tanks moved in … many civilians were
slaughtered in the prolonged mopping up, whole districts razed’
(Seale 1988: 333).
Two months later a US intelligence report said: ‘The total casualties
for the Hama incident probably number about 2,000. This includes an
estimated 300 to 400 members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s elite
‘Secret Apparatus’ (DIA 1982: 7). Seale recognises that the Army also
suffered heavy losses. At the same time, ‘large numbers died in the
hunt for the gunmen … government sympathizers estimating a mere 3,000
and critics as many as 20,000 … a figure of 5,000 to 10,000 could be
close to the truth’ He adds:
‘The guerrillas were formidable opponents. They had a fortune in
foreign money … [and] no fewer than 15,000 machine guns’ (Seale 1988:
335). Subsequent Muslim Brotherhood accounts have inflated the
casualties, reaching up to ‘40,000 civilians’, and attempting to hide
the vicious insurrection by claiming that Hafez al Assad had simply
carried out a ‘civilian massacre’ (e.g. Nassar 2014). The then Syrian
President blamed a large scale foreign conspiracy for the Hama
insurrection. Seale observes that Hafez was ‘not paranoical’, as many
US weapons were captured and foreign backing had come from several US
collaborators: King Hussayn of Jordan, Lebanese Christian militias
(the Israeli-aligned ‘Guardians of the Cedar’) and Saddam Hussein in
Iraq (Seale 1988: 336-337).
The Hama insurrection helps us understand the Daraa violence because,
once again in 2011, we saw armed Islamists using rooftop sniping
against police and government officials, drawing in the armed forces,
only to cry ‘civilian massacre’ when they and their collaborators
came under attack from the Army. Although the US, through its allies,
played an important part in the Hama insurrection, when it was all
over US intelligence dryly observed that: ‘the Syrians are
pragmatists who do not want a Muslim Brotherhood government’ (DIA
1982: vii)."
Zumindest der DIA-Bericht, dessen Inhalt unangenehm bekannt vorkommt
angesichts des angestifteten Kriegs in Syrien, ist dabei noch frei
verfügbar:
https://syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/dia-syria-muslimbrotherh
oodpressureintensifies-2.pdf