DvHinHH schrieb am 25.03.2024 11:01:
Frieder schrieb am 24.03.2024 18:24:
daß die USA islamistische Kämpfer gegen Moskau instrumentalisiert. War 1978ff. in Afghanistan mit den Mudssheddin ja genau so, und ist inzwischen bekannt, und so dokumentiert, daß es reicht, auf Wikipedia zu verweisen.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone
besonders interessanter Aspekt:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone#Die_%E2%80%9Eafghanische_Falle%E2%80%9C
Bis man zum jetzigen Fall die Informationen hat, was wirklich gespielt wird, wird es noch ein weilchen dauern. Aber die erforderniss einer Friedenspolitik, welche im Kalten Krieg die Provokationsspielchen immer begleitet hat, wird dringender denn je.so, wie ich das aus dem Wiki-Artikel rauslese, war es eine Operation in Afghanistan gegen die schon einsickernden Russen.
Wir können die damaligen Einschätzungen der Amerikaner nachlesen - gibt es irgendwas zur Einschätzung der damaligen Lage und den möglichen Optionen aus Moskau? Damit meine ich nicht die Prawda...
Zum Beispiel hier, die Sowjets fürchteten, dass Amin "den Sadat macht":
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-01-29/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-1979-not-trumps-terrorists-nor-zbigs-warm-water-ports
"Soviet Politburo documents that first became available in the 1990s show the real Soviet fear was that the head of the Afghan Communist regime, Hafizullah Amin, was about to go over to the Americans. (Egyptian president Anwar Sadat famously flipped in 1972, ejected thousands of Soviet advisers, and became the second largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. foreign aid.) "
Und zur "Afghanistan-Falle":
https://doi.org/10.1093/dh%2Fdhz065
"This article will demonstrate that the “trap” thesis has little basis in fact. First, U.S. assistance for the Afghans was extremely limited and non-lethal in 1979, and the planning process reveals significant caution rather than an effort to induce an invasion. Military support options were discussed by the National Security Council (NSC) but consistently rejected as potentially offering Moscow justification for overt military intervention. Second, U.S. policies were almost wholly reactive and developed in response to the Soviets’ escalating military presence at a time of declining American influence in the Persian Gulf/South Asian region. Third, a Soviet invasion was not something desired or welcomed by the administration as it clashed with other priorities in 1979, having strategic implications and political consequences for Carter’s upcoming re-election campaign. Brzezinski’s actions through 1979 exhibited a meaningful effort to dissuade Moscow from intervening through publicizing the Sovietization of Afghanistan and warning of the adverse effects of military involvement. His post-invasion memos reveal concern, not opportunity, which belies the claim that inducing an invasion was his objective. Finally, the Soviet decision to intervene was undertaken primarily for political reasons related to the distrust of President Hafizullah Amin, and not as a result of an urgent military need to prevent the collapse of Kabul. Consideration of Washington’s reaction was minimal and U.S. policies were largely peripheral to the ultimate decision. In sum, a Soviet military intervention was neither sought nor desired by the Carter administration, and the covert program initiated in the summer of 1979 is insufficient to charge Carter and Brzezinski with actively attempting to ensnare Moscow in the “Afghan trap.”"