pewoo schrieb am 11.04.2024 13:54:
Tom Taylor schrieb am 11.04.2024 11:20:
Ich kann Ortega und Nicaragua gut verstehen, egal wie man nun zu Ortega steht (ich werde allerdings mittlerweile hellhörig, wenn unsere Medien anfangen ein gewähltes Staatsoberhaupt als „Machthaber“, „Diktator“ oder „Autokrat“
Was ist den Orthega für ein Präsident?
1979 stürzten Ortega und andere FSLN-Mitglieder unter der militärischen Führung seines Bruders Humberto Diktator Anastasio Somoza Debayle; ab Juli 1979 regierte Ortega Nicaragua als Kopf einer Regierungsjunta (Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional).
Und so ging es dann weiter….
So ging es dann wirklich weiter:
The Nicaraguan contras, now trained and reorganized by the Argentines, were seen by the Reagan Administration as a potential pressure force in their campaign against the Sandinista government. One of the alleged initial contacts in what would become American inheritance of the Argentine operation was John Carbaugh, the roving aide to U.S. Senator Jesse Helms; Carbaugh had attended the 1980 CAL conference in Buenos Aires.
An American diplomat in Honduras confirmed that Carbaugh "was in and out of here all the time from '80 to '82.
"He also made a lot of trips to Buenos Aires in the same period. I heard he was tight with Alvarez and Major Bob [Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador] and was backed by money from right-wing groups in the States." 3
In late 1981, President Reagan signed a secret directive releasing $19.5 million in CIA funds to assist the contras. In November 1981, after a series of meetings between officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Argentine advisers in Honduras, the United States took over the funding of the guerrillas, now reconstituted as "freedom fighters." 4
From the beginning of U.S. involvement with the "secret war" in mid-1981 what was called a "tripartite" structure was put in place to run it. The United States supplied the money, Argentina supplied training and administrative skills (and initially a fig leaf to cover U.S. involvement), and Honduras supplied the territory from which operations were mounted, according to U.S. intelligence sources and participants in the program.
A joint staff to manage and coordinate this program was created. The Nicaraguan rebel forces were represented by Enrique Bermudez and Emilio Echaverry, former Nicaraguan National Guard officers. Two Argentine colonels, Osvaldo Ribeiro and Santiago Villegas (also identified as Jose Ollas), represented their country. Alvarez represented Honduras. And the CIA station chief and one of his assistants represented the United States.In late 1981, the Honduran military rulers, bowing to pressure Initially brought to bear by the Carter Administration, held generalelections. A civilian country doctor, Roberto Suazo Cordova, was elected president and took office just as the CIA-Argentine-contra coalition was coming together.
(...)
Suazo made Alvarez a general and elevated him to head of the armed forces— a violation of the norms of promotion and a move that won both men many enemies in the Honduran military. Later in 1982, Alvarez received yet another promotion, from chief to commander in chief of the armed forces, a title customarily held by the president.
(...)
But Alvarez had crossed a man who would fight back. During his brief tenure at FUSEP, Torres Arias had learned a lot about his archfoe, in particular about the paramilitary squads Alvarez had nurtured to "fight communism." Soon the colonel surprised everyone by publicly breaking his silence and telling the world what he knew. In August 1982, Torres Arias surfaced in Mexico City, denouncing his former boss for organizing the Honduran death squads and for launching his country on the path to war with Nicaragua.General Alvarez had and has under his direct command a Special Investigations personnel whose chief is Captain Alexander Hernandez, who, following orders from the general, has made disappear (names of prominent missing leftists) and many more people. . . .
On the day he (Alvarez) became commander in chief of FUSEP, the era of the disappeared and clandestine cemeteries was initiated.
(...)
That Alvarez, the chief advocate of U.S. actions in Honduras, was also using the Argentines and the contras for his own ends was either unknown or ignored by the CIA. "These [Argentine] advisors remain unidentified," Americas Watch, a human rights organization, reported in late 1982, "and both the Honduran and Argentine governments have denied their presence in Honduras. Several witnesses and human rights monitors point to evidence of their direct involvement in repressive actions. The participation of Argentine agents is not yet completely proven, but human rights observers cannot help noticing the striking similarities between the pattern now evolving In Honduras and the 15,000 to 20,000 disappearances conducted by the Argentine armed forces between 1976 and 1980. Those similarities include the use of heavily-armed plainclothesmen who do not identify themselves, but clearly exercise official authority.
(...)
What Americas Watch suspected in 1982 has since been confirmed by Honduran military officers, contra leaders, and the new democratic government in Argentina that took office in November 1983. It was only then that the Argentine advisers still operating in Central America were pulled out.Of even greater use to Alvarez than the Argentines themselves were those that the Argentines were training: the Nicaraguan contras. In late 1984, top Honduran military officers leaked information to Reuters correspondent Anne Marie O'Connor charging that some top contra officers had assisted Alvarez's death squads.
According to O'Connor, the Honduran military attributed at least eighteen executions of Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Honduran citizens to the contras. The victims were suspected collaborators of the Salvadoran guerrillas who were believed to be transferring Sandinistasupplied arms through Honduras. One contra officer, the FDN's chief of counterintelligence, ex-National Guard Major Ricardo "El Chino" Lau, was believed to be the mastermind. 8
"The contras killed people in farms on both sides of the border [Honduras-Nicaragua]," "Ephron" confirmed. "They got people who were helping in the transfer of weapons [from the Sandinistas to the Salvadoran guerrillas]."
"Lobo," the student death squad operative, also discussed his ties to the contras, as did "Jorge," the secret policemen who arranged the "Lobo" interview. "Lobo" explained that, through his unit's infiltration of leftist labor unions, student groups, and guerrilla cells, and the torture of their victims for information prior to their executions, they had obtained valuable intelligence information that was "extremely useful" to the authorities. This information, which included maps of the location of several border "blind spots" where leftists smuggled arms from Nicaragua, was turned over to the Honduran authorities, who then passed it on to the contra commanders. This arrangement, "Lobo" said, resulted in several "important captures."
If the American advisers now flooding Honduras disapproved of this sharing of counterterror operations, they never mentioned it publicly. Rather, since General Alvarez was directing the campaign and Alvarez was their main ally, the United States had a vested interest in keeping such unpleasantries quiet.
Alvarez used his support from the Reagan Administration as the ultimate bargaining chip. Together, they ran roughshod over the newly elected and fragile congress. When the Honduran foreign minister attempted to negotiate with Nicaragua, offering to stop aid to the contras in return for stopping the Sandinista »roop buildup on the border, the initiative was quashed by Alvarez and John Negroponte, the American ambassador. Although the Honduran constitution requires congressional approval for the stationing of foreign troops on Honduran soil, Alvarez independently reached an agreement with the Reagan Administration for such a move in 1983.
This was the first crack in the alliance between Honduras' military and civilian rulers. Alvarez proved stronger than the civilians: [b]the congress authorized the plan June 21, a week after one hundred Green Berets arrived in the Puerta Castilla area to join twenty U.S. advisers already there to set up a training base. This month [August 1983] the United States begins up to five months of joint maneuvers with Honduras that will involve as many as five thousand American ground and air troops[/b]— another boost to the militarization of the country. 9
If there were any doubts about the importance the American government placed in its new ally, they weren't evident in its military assistance program to Honduras: it increased from $4 million in loans in 1980 to $77 million in grants in 1984.
https://archive.org/details/pdfy-YAnJOkt3G0B4uEGh/page/n255/mode/2up