Strategie der Einmischung

Man kommt nicht umhin, den Autor ob seiner ungenügenden Recherche zu kritisieren. Bei größerer Akribie wäre er nämlich auf ein Strategiepapier des US-Thinktanks RAND Corporation gestoßen, der die US-Streitkräfte berät und zu dessen Themen unter anderem Strategien zur Destabilisierung Russlands sowie Thesen zum Krieg mit China gehören. In einem Text unter dem Titel „Overextending and Unbalancing Russia - Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options“ werden ganz ungeniert Szenarien entwickelt, wie die USA Russlands Wirtschaft, Ansehen und Verteidigungsfähigkeit schädigen könnten. Angesichts dieser offen geäußerten Einmischungsstrategie fällt es schwer, an reine Zufälle zu glauben, die von der Ukraine bis nach Kasachstan reichen. Auffällig übrigens die inhaltliche Nähe der Position Baerbocks bezüglich von Nordstream 2 mit der gleich im ersten Abschnitt dargelegten energiepolitischen US-Maßnahmen.
Hier der Link mit einigen Auszügen.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10014.html
Economic Cost-Imposing Measures
Expanding U.S. energy production would stress Russia’s economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.
Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Measures
Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.
Increasing support to the Syrian rebels could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could risk further destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore, this option might not even be feasible, given the radicalization, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian opposition.
Promoting liberalization in Belarus likely would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, one that would result in a general deterioration of the security environment in Europe and a setback for U.S. policy.
Expanding ties in the South Caucasus—competing economically with Russia—would be difficult because of geography and history.
Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia would be very difficult and could prove costly. Increased engagement is unlikely to extend Russia much economically and likely to be disproportionately costly for the United States.