Skinheads in Eastern and Central Europe
Free to Hate or Hate to be Free?
Not long ago, on a major bridge in central Budapest spanning the Danube, a simple message in green was scrawled at one end: "skins have more hair than brains." What was amazing about this small bit of graffiti was not its profound wit in an age of commercialized, senseless and meaningless wall art, but that it remained there for the better part of a year. Not only that, it remained undefiled by counter-graffiti until the authorities finally whitewashed it away.
The significance of this is not so apparent but nevertheless important: the threat from, and menacing influence of, skinheads in Central and Eastern Europe has largely eclipsed. This is not to say that they have disappeared altogether or have become respectable members of civil society; on the contrary, they pose the same dangers to individuals as they do the world over. However, the fears at the beginning of the decade that skinheads would become a major destabilizing force in the region have passed, for the time being at least.
As the former communist states in the east began to come under the influence of reform and revolution in 1989, the rise of skinhead groups had become a major concern. It seemed that overnight gangs had mushroomed throughout the region. Yet the idea that the end of communism had directly led to the rise of skinhead movements in the east, that is, people had become free to hate, is erroneous and misleading. As with crime, pornography, and other social problems, the common assumption that democracy was the key that had opened a pandora's box fails to take into account that these vices existed under communism.
Without a doubt, in the initial confusion and chaos associated with a change in system, there was an increase in such vices. Because all negative news and information within the People's Democracies was suppressed, the sudden "appearance" of them in the "reformed" media made their rise more dramatic than it really was. Furthermore, with the seeming collapse and discreditation of authoritarian power structures, the police themselves were unsure of their role in the "new world order" and thus were reluctant assert their authority. Since then they have gained confidence and reasserted much of their authority - both within and without the democratic system.
However, this does not mean that the eclipse of the skinhead movements of the east is simply the result of the police reintegrating themselves within civil society. Instead, it has to do with what has been acutely termed "the iron law of oligarchy." In other words, money has become the driving force of all and any kind of activity or movement; social, economic, or political philosophy are no longer relevant and are made to fit this all-pervading paradigm.
Since the skinhead movements in the east are nationalist in nature, it should come as no surprise that the various communist regimes were at pains to contain them and refused to acknowledge their existence. Nevertheless, some regimes used skinheads to their advantage. Picking on ethnic minorities as their targets, especially the Roma (gypsies), skinhead groups were tolerated more in places like Romania and Czechoslovakia, and eventually came to work closely with extreme nationalist groups that operated in both countries, such as the Vatra in the former and the Stur Society in the latter.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, skinheads quickly became aligned with the nationalist far-right. Some politicians made no attempt to hide the fact that they flirted - or even openly aligned themselves with -skinhead groups. Likewise, skinheads sought out far-right, often anti-semitic, nationalist parties, such as the Hungarian Truth and Life Party, thereby swelling their ranks.
Since then, however, it has no longer become fashionable to have skinheads within party ranks. At first, skinheads were tolerated because they were outspoken for nationalist ideas. Yet, now that the political climate has settled somewhat, extreme nationalism is no longer an effective rallying point; people are more concerned with economic realities than vague nationalist rhetoric. Consequently, many right-wing politicians have toned down their rhetoric and have publicly distanced themselves from skinheads, preferring to abide by the norms of parliamentary democracy.
While there are thousands who may call themselves skinheads, a much smaller number of these can actually be considered true skinheads. The dress of skinheads from the east mirrors that of those in the west: closely cropped hair, highly shined black boots, black polo shirt, and bomber jacket. Similarly, many of them come from the ranks of disaffected youths who like the identity that comes from belonging to a group with its own set of rules and dress code, apparently more interested in the image of the movement as opposed to the ideology.
In many ways, the skinheads of Central and Eastern Europe are walking paradoxes. Although they claim to represent a political position, most have little or no understanding of the political process. In addition to this, while embracing a vague nationalist philosophy, they claim that they are not fascists but merely patriots. Ironically, their symbols, music, dress and vague knowledge of history, upon which their supposed nationalism is based, has led to a loss of support among true nationalists.
Even within the skinhead movements there appears to be "differences of opinion". In one incident, instead of beating up Gypsies, Blacks or Arabs, skinheads in Budapest were ready to beat each other. The notorious Hungarian skinhead leader, Albert Szabo, had to phone the police in desperation as his 30-strong group faced some 60 angry skinheads armed with baseball bats, clubs and other skinhead fighting weapons. The dispute apparently broke out for "ideological differences"; one group was said to belong to a "freemason, anarchist" splinter group. The battle was averted when 13 police cars, two action police vans and a special commando unit appeared on the scene.
While skinheads in the east at present are unlikely to become a political power that threatens to unleash the same destructive forces that tore the continent apart 50 years ago, authorities are unfortunately taking an overly lax attitude toward them. Central and Eastern Europe is still undergoing change, and there is no guarantee that the shaky peace that presently exists in the region will hold. Also, total economic collapse can't be ruled out either, which subsequently can lead to a rejuvenation of the skinhead movement. Finally, there exist many networks between skinhead groups in the east and west (mostly Germany and the US), organizations that not only give each other support but, with the help of the Internet, expands the nature and scope of their activities and influence.
They are down, but not out.
See also John Horvath's article about the Grufties in Eastern and Central Europe and the article in Christian Science Monitor GERMAN SPECIAL SQUAD TACKLES NEO-NAZI ATTACKS, BUT ROOTS OF PROBLEM REMAIN.