Creating the Needed Interface
Seite 3: Soviet Union Launches Sputnik
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. And in May 1958, Sputnik III was launched, weighing 7000 pounds. To the scientific community concerned with these events, this situation "demonstrated that the Soviet Union had both the booster and the guidance capability to send ICBM's to the U.S." [Barber, pg. I-22]
Advocates for scientific research like MIT's Killian utilized this opportunity to stress that the only way to counter the danger posed to national security was to develop a program of support for basic research in science and technology. In a speech given on February 23, 1959 to the Economic Club of Detroit, Killian warned [Barber, pg. I-26]:
The future of the United States, to an extraordinary degree, is in the hands of those who probe the mysteries of the atom, the cell and the stars. Especially is this true of that tiny part of our creative effort which we inadequately term basic research....Such a serious inbalance is a hazard to the economy, the safety, and the health of this country. If we are to continue to maintain an overall defense strength second to none, if we are to prevent Sputnik surprises in the future, we must augment this effort.
The Soviet Union's apparent technological superiority created a serious concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government. A report prepared under Henry Kissinger's direction was published on January 6, 1958, stating [Ibid.]:
Mankind...is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to achieve world domination that seeks to exploit all dissatisfactions and to magnify all tensions; and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization....A new technology of unprecedented power and destructiveness has placed all nations of the world in dire peril....
Even Eisenhower himself went on public record, a month after the Sputnik launch, in a radio broadcast, exclaiming [Barber, pg I-19]:
The world will witness future discoveries even more startling than that of nuclear fission. The question is: Will we be the ones to make them?
And Nelson Rockefeller, special assistant to Eisenhower, delivered a report by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Quarles to the National Security Council (NSC), explaining [Barber, pg. I-20]:
I am impressed by the costly consequences of allowing the Russian initiative to out run ours through an achievement that will symbolize scientific and technological advancement to people everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved makes this a race that we cannot afford to lose.
The report recognized that people around the world respected science and technology and looked to it as the promise of a better life. The postwar challenge of whether the U.S. or the Soviet Union would replace Europe for world leadership in science and technology became an urgent problem requiring some form of immediate action. The barriers within the U.S. government to support for basic research in science and to the development of technology had to be overcome if the U.S. government didn't want to cede eminence as the leader in science and technology to the Soviet Union.
U.S. Government Begins Measures to Meet Challenge
Outwardly, this problem was met with a calm veneer in the White House, but in reality there was an urgent atmosphere that required immediate steps be taken. Those steps soon included the appointment of a science advisor to the President, James R. Killian Jr., and the appointment of a Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Also within the U.S. Department of Defense, a new agency was set up to fund and support basic research. The new agency was called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The original proposed research had to do with research in science and technology related to space.
ARPA Is Created
Discussing the vested interests within the DOD, Price presents the competition between the Services as a problem to be solved. Price proposes that "the department of defense would be stronger if it contained a small, flexible and enterprising experimental organization entirely independent of the military services and reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense." (Ibid.) Also he gives as a model the "Few Quick" agency that was a subdivision of the OSRD and made it possible to have scientists turning out experimental models of inventions which demonstrated novel or unconventional ideas.
Price suggests that this political problem in the Services during the postwar period was the result of the fact that "they are forced to compete for their respective 'roles and missions' because Congress has not been willing to delegate authority to determine roles and missions to the responsible civilian executives or to permit a civilian executive to develop the stability or the staff necessary to do the job." (Price, pg 155)
A similar proposal for a design of an agency within the Department of Defense was suggested by Von Neumann at the Riehlman hearings. Congressman Baldwin asks Von Neumann (Riehlman, pg 373):
There is another possibility here which might exist. I understand that you are speaking of a civilian organization outside of the military department, but you want it to be understood that there might be a research and development organization within the Department of Defense, but still on civilian lines, in which the military support functions are distinct and separate from the organization itself.
Von Neumann responds:
Very much so, and I argued against complete separation. That is, separation to the degree to which the OSRD was separated or the degree to which the British Ministry of Supply is separate.
In the plan to create ARPA, an institutional structure was designed to prevent its being taken over by vested interests. There was also an effort to create an agency that would be able to support basic research in science and technology. That is why when ARPA was created in early 1958, its design provided for it to be directly under the Secretary of Defense to protect its autonomy.
The impetus and the documents creating ARPA are instructive. There was recognition that there were conservative forces acting within the military that would impede the development of new technology and new scientific concepts and methods. This included competition among the different branches of the Services for new powers and the expansion of their jurisdictional boundaries which might become a political battleground as a result of new developments or weaponry.
The authorization to create ARPA was contained within Public Law 85-325 of February 12, 1958. Included in the purpose of the Act was to confer authority on the Secretary of Defense, to (Barber, Figure II-1):
engage in such advanced projects essential to the Defense Department's responsibilities in the field of basic and applied research and development....
The directive of February 7, 1958 establishing ARPA stated (Barber, Figure II-2):
The purpose of this directive is to provide within the Department of Defense an agency for the direction and performance of certain advanced research and development projects....The Director of Advanced Projects shall report to the Secretary of Defense.
The evolving design for ARPA included the following:
- That the director could be a civilian scientist.
- That the director report directly to the Secretary of Defense.
- That the budget be assigned directly by the Director and in direct contact with the Secretary of Defense.
- That program managers could be scientists.
- That there be an expedited contract signing and implementation process.
As could be expected, the Services vigorously objected. Their objection brought about a change in ARPA's organizational structure. A Defense Director of Research and Engineering (DDR&E) was appointed below the Secretary of Defense and the head of ARPA reported instead to the DDR&E.
By 1960 most of the space related research had been moved out of ARPA into a civilian agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In its place were programs involving Ballistic Missile Systems (BMS), like the Defender Program, and radar development. There was also a recognition that the computer was important, but there had been difficulty understanding how to realize its potential.