Bully for the Bully Bullshit
Will freedom of the press survive in Hungary?
For the past several weeks the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán has been embroiled in a controversy over a new Media Law introduced late last year. Many within and without the country have criticized the law as an affront to the freedom of the press. The government and its supporters, meanwhile, see nothing wrong with it and accuse their critics of waging an unjustified negative campaign against the government. András Koltay, a member of the newly created Media Council, went so far as to assert that the mounting furor over the new law was politically motivated and that a majority of the western press has simply fallen for the line of the Hungarian opposition.
Political motivations aside, a common charge leveled against critics of the Media Law is that those who are against it lack information and aren't fully aware of what they are complaining about. Yet as a public demonstration in mid-January outside parliament clearly showed, campaigners against the Media Law know precisely why they are worried. In a petition to Parliament, the Constitutional Court, and the government, protesters called for the political independence of the media authority, the abrogation of arbitrary and disproportionate fines, the honoring of journalists' confidential sources, and the restoration of the independence of state news editorial offices.
The fact that some ten thousand attended the demonstration in Budapest attests to the growing opposition of the government's attempt at regulating the media. While many had already pledged their support for the demonstration in advance via the Internet, there was a feeling that only a couple of hundred would show up. Given the disdain for politics within Hungary at the moment and the fact that nowadays it's much easier to press "like" on Facebook rather than actually turning up at a demonstration, the size of the crowd was actually quite impressive. Admittedly, the issue still hasn't galvanized as many as one would expect given its significance. The reason for this is many; sadly, the polarized state of Hungarian politics is such that many end up passively supporting (or at least keeping silent about) issues and policies for fear of being branded as a traitor to the cause. In a sense, it's an extension of the goulash communist years, the catchword being "those who are not against us are with us".
Ironically, media coverage of the demonstration (both foreign and domestic) was meager. As one protester later wrote:
Like I guessed on an earlier thread, I didn't see that many foreign journos walking about, perhaps they were up at the stage? Or perhaps like the BBC's Nick Thorpe, they were being wined and dined elsewhere by Fidesz apparachiks? For Nick, despite what he may have written in "The Unfinished Revolution", democracy is obviously now safe and sound in CE Europe and it's time to dip into the libamaj [goose liver pate] and Tokaj [a fine desert wine] while the plebs and raggety students continue the fight he should still be covering.
In spite of the scant media coverage, the Media Council nevertheless took the time to respond to some of the points the demonstrators made in their petition. As it was to be expected, however, this response simply reiterated the line that the points in question were misunderstandings on behalf of the demonstrators. In the case of respect for the privacy of sources, for instance, the Media Council claimed that investigative journalists can't be compelled to disclose their sources; hence they can't be fined for not doing so. As for the huge fines themselves, the Media Council doesn't regard them to be disproportionate because they take into consideration the market weight and economic power of the media to be penalized. Moreover, the decisions of the Media Council can be overruled in court.
Finally, concern over the political independence of the media authority and media bodies will be addressed by a Code for Public Media Services (the guidelines the Media Council adheres to) which will be prepared with the involvement of professional and civic and NGOs. The modification of this code will be possible only by a Board of Public Services which will consist of the biggest and most influential NGOs, and not by the Media Council itself.
Fine in theory, in practice it's another story
The notion that journalists can't be compelled to disclose their sources isn't specifically mentioned in the law, thus there is no guarantee this won't happen. Meanwhile, the idea that the huge fines reflect the market weight and economic power of the media to be penalized is a matter of opinion. While a right to appeal in the courts may exist, the legal fees themselves are prohibitive enough and there is no mention of whether these costs would be reimbursed in the case of a successful appeal. Ambiguities also exist for the so-called Code for Public Media Services and Board of Public Services. The establishment of such a code isn't specifically mentioned in the law; furthermore, it's not clear how the NGOs and civic organizations that help draft the code will be selected and whether an effort will be made to balance the members of this board.
In many ways, the fact that the Media Law isn't up to democratic norms despite the government's claim to the contrary is also reflected in the underhanded way in which it was made public. For example, when making an official English translation of the law, several key passages were left out. The government swiftly reacted noting that the sections were left out because they are the technical and temporary portions of the law. "We decided to translate first the main part of the law," said a spokesperson for the Hungarian government, pointing out that the request for more clarity on the law came on December 23rd, a mere day before Christmas Eve. Hence, "this was left out because of the heavy work load during the Christmas period, but this is on the way as soon as the translators are finished."
For some, such an explanation was unconvincing, to say the least. As one observer wrote:
Dear God, they may well have said 'We did do the homework but it's not here, Sir, because the dog ate it.' … They are not submitting an essay to be corrected by Feri Bacsi's language school, this is highly important legislation going to the very top of the EU.
Perhaps equally embarrassing is the debacle over the final text of the legislation. Soon after the Media Law was officially approved, it was noticed that the text which was signed into law and made public was not exactly that same as the one which was debated and ultimately passed by parliament. The explanation for this discrepancy was also quick in coming: the law underwent several last minute changes and a previous working copy was put forward as the official public version by mistake.
Ultimately, whether or not these blunders were the result of incompetence or poor judgment is a moot point. If these oversights were the result incompetence, then the government shouldn't be entrusted with drafting such an important piece of legislation in the first place. On the other hand, considering the underhanded way the government has until now gone about the business of making new laws, it's not unlikely that such oversights were the result of something other than plain incompetence.
All this does little to shake the trust that many continue to have in the government, however. Indeed, supporters of Viktor Orbán appear to exercise, as one observer put it, "a strange and scary Wagnerian 'mystical nationalism'", by responding to criticism of their leader in a highly romantic and emotional manner. To this extent, many feel that opposition to the Media Law is nothing more than the "absolutely surreal hatred the postcommunist left-liberals" have toward the government. To this extent, Hungary seldom makes headlines abroad and when it does it never seems to be "good news".
Misleading headlines about Hungary
Without a doubt, there are some cases when the negative spotlight the country receives is accentuated to the point of fabrication. A prime example is an article in the German magazine Der Spiegel late last year which attempted to portray Hungary as a hotbed of anti-Semitism in Central and Eastern Europe. The article not only contains many factual errors, but considering that the Hungarian Guard (a right-wing paramilitary group, the focal point of the article in question) is in severe decline, dropping from over a thousand members in 2009 to just a few hundred in 2010, the notion of Budapest being the capital of anti-Semitism in Europe is clearly ridiculous.
On the other hand, not all negative reports about Hungary are so malicious. Some strive for a more balanced view but still end up ringing alarm bells, feeling that "Europe needs to send Hungary a signal" and that "it's time the EU made some noise about Hungary's attacks on democracy and the rule of law." Usually such views are regarded by the right as typical left-liberal media trash, full of political malice which serves simply to degrade the government and the country.
Although supporters of the current government can do little but grin and bear the criticism, sometimes someone can go so far as to provoke a nasty response, as in the case of the Austrian journalist Paul Lendvai. In a book entitled "My Squandered Country - Hungary under Transformation", Lendvai paints a critical picture of Orbán's government, declaring it a risk to the stability of Central Europe. Soon after the book was published the conservative Hungarian weekly Heti Válasz claimed that Lendvai worked as an informer for the communist party. While the question of whether or not Lendvai was an informer for the former regime is open to debate, what is of interest is the way in which Lendvai's "connection" to the dictatorship "suddenly" surfaced.
Sadly the past dies hard in Hungary, with blackmail still widely used to discredit a thorny opponent. Such ignominious tactics were first employed by Joseph Antall (Hungary's first post-communist prime minister) when he revealed that his former ally turned political rival, the far-right demagogue Istvan Csurka, was an informer for the secret police (the plan backfired and Csurka's popularity surged as a result). This Machiavellian method has been used by all sides of the political spectrum. Zoltan Pokorni, a high ranking member of the FIDESZ, soon found this out when it was reveled that his own father was an informer for the secret police. The use of this same tactic to discredit Lendvai, therefore, shows that little has changed over the years in Hungarian politics.
Sudden rise of Orbán as a media darling of the west
While right-wing supporters of the government like to moan and groan about the power of the left-liberal media both at home and abroad, and that the present government is in many ways a helpless victim of this all-powerful regime (hence the need for the Media Law), the truth of the matter is that the present government has had its share of positive feedback as well. Indeed, it appears that some western liberal media outlets have been friendlier toward Orbán ever since his swift response to the red sludge disaster in October. What impressed many was the arrest of the company's managing director Zoltán Bakonyi to the extent that people were singing his praises as if he were an environmental messiah.
The same appears to hold true in terms of economics. The Hungarian government's tough line against the IMF last summer had, in many ways, enabled Orbán and the FIDESZ to become the new darlings of the western liberal media, for a little while at least. In the British newspaper The Guardian, for example, the American economist Mark Weisbrot, renowned for his opposition to privatization, globalization, and the IMF, praised Orbán for pioneering what he believed was an alternative to austerity. Subsequently, media outlets throughout the country featured lengthy reports citing Weisbrot's article ad nauseaum as if the government had somehow scored a major victory of sorts. In many ways this underscores the extent of the inferiority complex Hungary has when it comes to its image in the foreign media.
Perhaps the best example of this sudden rise of Orbán as a media darling of the west is a much cited article (in Hungary, at least) by Adam LeBor entitled Bully for 'bully' Orbán's decision to stand up to the IMF and EU brutes. What filled Hungarians with pride and joy to the bursting point was LeBor's ludicrous and irrelevant comparison of Orbán's "heroic" stand against the IMF as an event comparable to that of the 1956 Revolution. As if this wasn't absurd enough, LeBor went so far as to suggest that while the revolution in 1956 may have failed to trigger a chain reaction, "perhaps Hungary's stand against capitalist despots will spark one this time."
What is most ironic about all this is that the cerebral diarrhea emanating from this article comes from none other than one of Orbán's most vociferous critics. Of all those who have written regularly about Orbán and the FIDESZ, Adam LeBor has been the most negative and who has, for the most part, regarded both the party and the man as fascist, to say the least.
Yet not everyone who ends up being worshipped in Hungary stays loyal. In mid-December last year American columnist and historian Anne Applebaum flew to Budapest to receive the "Petofi Prize", an award established a couple of years ago by the foundation behind the "House of Terror" museum.Applebaum apparently received the award in recognition of her writing about the horrors of communism and the development of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe.
At the time some criticized Applebaum as a thoughtless, craven careerist for accepting the award from a government which had just days before enacted a Media Law that went against everything she apparently stood for. A mere two weeks later, however, Applebaum published an article in the Washington Post entitled Jeopardizing democracy in Hungary in which she bemoaned the fact that "Hungary is now cursed with a leader who is too popular - or has too large a majority - and who can change his country's laws and constitution to keep himself in power without any violence."
If there is something that can be gleaned from this rather confusing media image of Viktor Orbán and his government it's one of squandered opportunities. As far as his supporters are concerned, however, the inability to maintain a positive foreign media image means that the FIDESZ is a need of a new media strategy.
The Media Law: an integral part of a comprehensive media strategy?
This isn't the first time that such a conclusion had been drawn. Following their inexplicable defeat in parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2006, the FIDESZ turned to left-wing media experts for help, much to the chagrin of their right-wing counterparts. Various initiatives have been implemented, among them the establishment of Spröd in 2007, a right-wing radio talk show devoted to bashing the former Socialist government and reinforcing support for the FIDESZ. Meanwhile, a professional dramaturge was hired by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice for "strategic advice" in many fields - including government strategies and public communications.
In many ways, the recently enacted Media Law appears to be an integral part of this comprehensive media strategy. To fill in the gaps, other restrictions have been introduced. The Speaker of the Parliament, László Kövér, recently revealed plans to restrict reporters' ability to do their jobs within the parliament building. For instance, instead of having permanent passes, journalists would have to register each time they attend a parliamentary session and their freedom of movement would also be restricted. In addition to this, MPs would only be allowed to answer questions from the media when they "feel sufficiently prepared".
At this point, the question naturally arises as to why Viktor Orbán and the FIDESZ believe all this is to be necessary, especially given their huge level of support they currently enjoy. Given the arrogance with which they have been pushing their agenda forward, it appears that the Media Law and other such measures are a reflection of the insecurity they still feel given their disastrous losses in the previous two elections. These losses were mainly due to the FIDESZ wasting away their advantage as opposed to their opponents winning the support of voters. In 2002, for instance, Orbán attempted to play the role of the dignified statesman and didn't bother to start campaigning until shortly before the vote, giving his rival a head start and an insurmountable advantage. In 2006, meanwhile, the FIDESZ had focused too heavily on the negative and thereby alienated themselves from voters.
What both Viktor Orbán and the FIDESZ perhaps don't realize is that this same situation appears to be re-emerging once more. The problem in the past is that they had overplayed their hand, and now it looks as if they are doing the same thing over again, this time through the likes of the Media Law. While they may feel that they are consolidating their hold on power for the next decade or so through such actions, the opposite may actually be true. If they aren't careful, they could be in for a nasty surprise come national elections in 2014; their seeming invincible level support could suddenly disappear without a trace.