EUROPA TRANSITION

There are many conflicting visions of Europe, future Europes. In the end most of these visions will disappear from the scene. Historians will then say, "that was an inevitable development". However, the only thing which seems inevitable, is that there will be a war, to decide which visions disappear. Conflicting geopolitical futures are typical causes of war. There would be the chance to develop a new form of state. The dissolution of the former DDR into the BRD could be a model. But Europe seems to be too stagnant and fearful to go one step into the future.

What is Europe? To deal with the large number of possibilities, it is easier to say what Europe is not.

Europe is not a nation. Because Europe is not a nation, Europe needs no identity. Because Europe is not a nation, Europe needs no culture.

Culture and identity

Consider European culture by asking: which entities have cultures? Long-term entities, to start with. The passengers on a tram are a group, but do not have a common culture: the group is too short-lived and transient. The ideal of the nation is transgenerational. Culture is seen as transmitted over generations. However, not all long-term organisations have culture. A church has a doctrine to transmit in time. An association has statutes, to ensure organisational continuity. Nations, however, have a culture.

It may seem simplistic, but it is possible to define culture on the basis of this. Culture is that which is transmitted from one generation to another, to ensure survival of an entity: tribe, society, nation. True, a minimal definition, but it does emphasise the distinction between general social activity and culture.

Is this necessary? Nationalists say that it is. They say any nation state must have a culture. However, this is circular reasoning. If there is no transgenerational entity, no culture is needed. There is no nation of Q-khazia, therefore no Q-khazian culture is necessary. The world does not end because of this. If there is no Germany, no German culture is necessary. The world will not end because of this.

Pan-culture or Pan-kitsch

The nationalist idea - that a nation must have a culture - has been accepted by pan-Europeanists. This is logically consistent: pan-nationalism differs from nationalism largely in scale. In practice, they can not decide: a unitary culture, or a collection of national cultures? So they search for some national symbolic culture, which is famous outside that nation. These symbols are then labelled European.

This internal inconsistency leads to the caricatural nature of the European Culture promoted by pan-Europeanists. Journals such as Nexus or Civis Mundi (Netherlands), or Cadmos (Switzerland) engage in the intellectual search for a pan-European high culture. So do activities funded by the European Cultural Foundation, or the academic conferences on European identity. In this search, certain elements are endlessly repeated, and their relative importance discussed: Hellenic heritage, Roman law, Christianity, the unity of mediaeval Europe, the universities as transnational link, the Renaissance, humanism, the Enlightenment. Such conferences are perhaps the only place, where this European culture exists. If it was ignored, it might disappear. Yet the conferences only increase the confusion. The more symbolic the Euro-culture must be, the greater the problems. Who is "our" Euro-dramatist? Goethe the German, or Shakespeare the Englishman? Which Bulgarian? And who unified Europe in the year 800? Was it Karl der Grosse, Charlemagne, Carlo Magno, or Carolus Magnus?

Identity

European culture is, so far, a flop. That seems to be the case with European identity as well. At the pan-European scale, the sense of identity and culture are linked. Often the words are used as synonyms: common European identity, common European culture, common European heritage. There is no doubt that the general use of the word identity in this context, is in the sense of belonging to a transgenerational national state, and knowing its culture.

In this sense only nationalists have an identity. Only pan-European pan-nationalists have a European identity.

There is no reason to presume I have an identity, since I oppose nationalism. If I am not a Moslem, I can not be Shia or Sunni. If I am not a Christian, I can not be Protestant or catholic. If I am not a nationalist, I can not be French or German or Kurdish. German is a sub-category of nationalist, as Protestant is a sub-category of Christian.

In the nationalist concept of a state, there is a pre-existing nation, a community extending across time. The primary function of the state, for nationalists, is to reserve a territory for this purpose. Nationalists want territory, but even more importantly, they want it for a long period of time.

European pan-nationalists extend this model to Europe. Some form of European political entity should be formed, they say, to transmit European culture to succeeding generations. And what is European culture? That which is transmitted to future generations. And why is European culture transmitted? To ensure the survival of Europe in future generations. There is no point in this circularity: and anyway, there are enough nations already.

State Europa

Some entities do not need an identity or a culture: states. There are many possible forms of state. I can have no identity, and so also other people, enough to populate a state. If one non-identity state is possible, others are too. If a state does not seek its own transgenerational existence, then it needs no culture. The nation state is merely one specific model of state It is not "The State".

Therefore, Europe can be a state of a new type: without identity or culture, and specifically non-national. Europe can specifically reject the nationalist idea of using territory for the transmission of culture. With this definition of Europe, there can be no pan-European "nation", no federal Europe of the nations, no federal Europe of the historical regions, no federal Europe of the peoples. All of these are entities with a culture, and with a sense of identity.

New forms of state

This possible Europe would in fact open the way to a fundamental re-alignment of territory in Europe, and the emergence of new forms of state. Some of these are described in the short article on Post Democratic Space. It would be possible for a "state Europa" on this model, to allow extreme internal territorial autonomy. This idea of a "state Europa" deviates in a fundamental way from liberal constitutional states. It substitutes the principle of separation of territory, for the principle of separation of powers.

So this is quite different from the liberal-democratic vision of a European constitutional citizenship. In practice, that means a con-federal state anyway. And in practice, that means the nation states, under another name.

Liberal constitutionalism, and classic nationalism, both demand loyalty from the citizens. The "state Europa", without identity or culture, can simply dispense with the loyalty of its inhabitants. They are not citizens. They need not feel any emotional attachment to the state, any commitment. They can all be traitors if they like. Like culture and identity, treason is a specific attribute of nation states.

Future war

And that gives the picture, of a primary divide on the issue of Europe, the most probable scenario for war. That is, the transition from a Europe of the nations to a state Europa. A transition away from loyalty, culture, identity and community. On one side, a culture-less, identity-less entity. On the other side tradition, Heimat, culture, Nation.

The inevitability of war will be more obvious if I describe that process. The description is taken from an article for Web Architecture Magazine, about the destruction and construction during state transitions.

This is only one way of looking at state transition. The emphasis on destruction and construction came from a recent example: transition from two Germanies to one Germany.

So this is the matter which is so unpleasant, for so many people....

Europa statt Deutschland

The dissolution of the DDR into the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) can be a model for the dissolution of Germany into Europe: Europa statt Deutschland.

This is what the apparently formal phrase "state Europa" means. You will lose almost all the social structures, which give meaning to your lives. They are the social structures of a nation state, and when that form of state disappears, the social structure will also.

The DDR shows what should happen with the existing German state in Europa: dissolution and loss of territory to Europa. It will simply cease to exist, as did the DDR. Finis Germaniae Europa est. The other nation states should similarly disappear.

A nation has national borders. The opening of the divisive border was of great symbolic importance in the process of German unification. The opening of borders in Europe is more than symbolic for a state of Europa.

The Wall, as symbol of the border among the German states, was destroyed: the symbolic first act of re-unification.

In a transition process from the nations in Europe, borders and border police will disappear. National border fortifications should be removed. All border posts should be demolished, and the sites completely cleared of any traces.

No mistake, these are symbols of independence and sovereignty. In Berlin, the Berlin Wall as symbol of the independence of the DDR, was not only destroyed - it was sold to tourists as a symbolic humiliation of the DDR. After Germany is dissolved, it could happen again. But, selling pieces of the Reichstag would put Japanese tourists in the symbolic position of historical judge.

A more appropriate special symbolic act, a symbolic destruction of the nation state in Europe, is the legal destruction of the Brandenburger Tor. It was already, for a century, a national symbol of Germany. By its position beside the Wall, it became a global symbol of national unity. By its restoration, in a united Germany, it became a symbol of the triumph of nationalism. More than any other site, the Brandenburger Tor is the symbol of nationalism in Europe and the world. I suggest it should be bought by the European Commission. Later, it can be legally demolished by explosives, as a celebration of the end of nationalism in Europe.

Construction

In Berlin the transition of state meant a construction program, especially for state buildings. A programme of conversion of buildings and infrastructure is always necessary, to adjust to state transitions.

But, people once worked in all those ex-DDR buildings. If old national governments continue, in their old buildings, in their old capital cities, then obviously there is no new state of Europa. In any real transformation, millions of politicians and bureaucrats (of the old Europe) will no longer have a function. In the German case, some of the leaders of the DDR fled. (Honecker to Russia, and later to Chile). It would certainly speed the end of nations in Europe, if the United States gave political asylum, to former leaders of nation states.

In this circumstance, the bases of the US military in Europe can have a real and symbolic function, as exit gateway. They can be used for an evacuation programme of national leaders, and nationalists, to the United States. There are three simultaneous exit movements: withdrawal of US troops, the move of government leaders to asylum, and the evacuation of nationalists. It is a symbolic and real exit of the old Europe and its ally. If necessary, the transport infrastructure should be adapted for a mass evacuation of nationalists.

What is the social and cultural effect, for the nationalists? In Germany the concept of loyalty to the DDR as a state, has been replaced by nostalgia for a lost society. This will happen 47 times over, when the 47 nation states in Europe disappear. If an evacuation programme succeeds, nationalists from Europe can re-create their nostalgic past in the United States. Heritage parks can be constructed there, instead of burdening Europe with the past. If there is no longer a German state, a Heimat Park Deutschland could be constructed in Florida.

Migration

End of division means migration. On re-unification, the German state acquired 15 million extra citizens. This is an extremely unusual situation, within nation states. It occurred only because Germany was considered a divided nation. That is more obvious if you compare the situation of people of Turkish origin in Germany. People from Turkey cannot just come to Germany, and demand a house or unemployment benefit. Nor can they go to Spain, to make these demands, or to any other nation state. Yet that is what happened to the DDR after the dissolution of the DDR. After some transitional restrictions, 65 million new citizens have a right of internal migration to the former DDR territory, with full equivalence of rights.

Now consider the consequences of this in a future state of Europe. Germany is the largest existing EU state, with 80 million people. Europe has about 600-700 million people, depending on the definition. Approximately 650 million people will be free to go to Germany, and be treated on an equal basis. If they do, Germans will be outnumbered 8 to 1 on their former territory. For small nation states, the ratio is much larger.

Even if only a fraction migrate, the consequences for urban and regional planning are enormous. All spatial planning in the existing Europe is national: they are made on the assumption that national sovereignty will continue. On the assumption, that approximately the same people will continue to live, on the same territory. In such plans, "high immigration" means 5% or 10% immigration, spread over several years. No plans in Europe take account of mass transfer of population in a state of Europe, no-one expects inward migration rates of 100%, or even 1000% in urban areas. Yet, this is an almost inevitable consequence, after removal of national borders.

Planning

The former DDR and BRD did have some co-ordination of regional and transport planning, especially in the Berlin area. At least in the long term, the possibility of unification was considered. (Again, because both states claimed to represent a single nation). In Europe, there is no planning for a single state: no attempt to think about the consequences for infrastructure, transport, and housing construction. The disappearance of nation states, will leave Europe without any comprehensive plan. Perhaps it is better this way. The European Commission, in the "Europa 2000" and "Europa 2000+" plans, is only capable of co-ordinating national plans. Both these documents also assume the continued existence of nation states: they are not plans for Europe, despite the titles.

It is clear: there will have to be massive construction for a new Europe. That should include a specific programme of transport infrastructure, for Europe. (Not, as in the German projects, almost entirely road construction). Symbolic aspects can be important: in Germany, DDR trains were re-painted in the west German colours. Trains in national colours are unacceptable in a non-national Europe.

Yet more unpleasant news about Europe. As in the case of the German unification projects, these infrastructure projects will have to be paid by the richer regions. Transfer taxes will be necessary, up to about 50% of income, in the richest regions. In re-united Germany, the modest transfer taxes are already politically unacceptable: European transfer taxes will encounter extreme opposition, in rich regions.

In other words, this is what Europe's residents, all over Europe are going to experience: all the loss of social structure experienced in the former DDR, plus all the extra taxes paid in western Germany. And more: there are other issues, such as multi-lingualism.

And this is just one model of a future Europe. From this perspective, it is extremely unlikely that this process could be accomplished without any violence, as in the German case. What made that possible? The conviction that both states were one nation. Neither the DDR, nor the BRD, nor the Soviet Union, nor the western Allies ever deviated from that. So all the 80 million people involved believed in the underlying logic of unity.

War causes

In Europe, the situation is the reverse: almost everyone has reason to oppose any transition from the present order. Yet that order can not continue for ever. This is one reason to believe, that the model described, a maximum transition, is a probable cause of war. War in Europe is like earthquakes: the longer it stays quiet in Europe, the bigger the shock when war comes.