March Showdown?
The political importance of an upcoming referendum in Hungary is a little overstated
In Hungary, there are three months which the present government dreads. March is one of them. March 15th is the anniversary of the 1848 revolution against Habsburg rule and has since become emblematic of Hungary's struggle for freedom. The power of this symbolism is such that during the communist era the anniversary was not held in high esteem by the authorities. Ironically, a similar situation exists today. Although in post-communist Hungary the anniversary is widely celebrated, since the bloody crackdown of street protests in 2006 it has become an important symbol for the political opposition. As a result, the authorities have responded by cordoning off the square in front of parliament and using a show of force through an increased police presence, one akin to a pseudo state of emergency.
This year is a little different than last, however. It appears that the authorities are a little more worried this time. Hence, police officers aren't allowed to take time off over the next two weeks and the country's medical services were told to have extra ambulances ready. When reports of these preparations were first leaked they were initially denied and put down to being a simple joke between colleagues; it has since been acknowledged that such preparations are taking place.
Apart from such preparations, what is also different this year as opposed to last is that these preparations are starting much earlier. The pseudo state of emergency will begin at the end of this week, one week prior to the actual anniversary. The reason for this is obvious: on March 9th a referendum will be held on whether health service user fees (visit fee and hospital usage fees) as well as higher education tuition fees imposed by the government over a year ago should be scrapped or not. While most agree about what will be the ultimate outcome of the referendum, the question is by what margin will the public come out and vote against the fees.
Road to Nowhere
The political opposition, led by the right-wing FIDESZ party, has been keen to stress that the importance of the referendum goes beyond simply the issue of various user fees. They contend that it is a vote on the government itself, and that a high voter turnout with a large margin in favour of scrapping the user fees will ultimately pressure the government to change course, with some hinting that in essence it will lead to the fall of the Gyurcsany government. Such populist rhetoric, however, is a little exaggerated. Indeed, the FIDESZ may have overplayed its hand during the referendum campaign. That is, while their strategy may be a success for them in the short run (the referendum) in the long run (i.e. the national elections in 2010) it may actually turn out to be a disappointing failure.
The claims by the FIDESZ that the referendum on March 9th goes far beyond simply the question of user fees are based on the success it had reaped during the EU elections in 2004. Then the FIDESZ won more seats than the Socialist-Liberal coalition; soon after, both Laszlo Kovacs and Peter Medgyessy fell from power as party leader and prime minister respectively.
The problem with this allusion is that the EU election results and the political events which soon followed have nothing in common. The resignation of Laszlo Kovacs as head of the ruling Socialist party was nothing more than a pre-planned graceful exit. At the time, possible fallout from the Kulcsar scandal was very real; a golden parachute to Brussels as an EU commissioner would ensure that if the scandal ever came to bringing anyone to justice (which to date it hasn't) Kovacs would be far away and well protected in Brussels. As for Medgyessy, his days were already numbered well before the EU elections, as early as 2003. Yet the palace coup had to wait, however, so as to not spoil the Socialists chances during the elections. When the time was ripe toward the end of 2004, the junior coalition suddenly pulled out of the government during a cabinet reshuffle. Medgyessy was then sacked by the Socialists, and Gyurcsany assumed power.
The claim by the FIDESZ that the referendum will somehow entail change - either in terms of the government or at least the direction of its policies - is groundless. Similar claims were made during the municipal elections of 2006 which had followed on the heels of a public outcry over revelations of comments made by the prime minister where he admitted that the Socialist Party had lied day and night in order to gain power. Subsequently, the Socialists had suffered a massive defeat and the FIDESZ claimed that the Gyurcsany government had no legitimacy. Gyurcsany, however, simply ignored the FIDESZ and the business of government carried on as usual.
This propaganda failure on the part of the FIDESZ is no doubt the reason why the EU election in 2004 was used as an example and not the municipal elections of 2006 during the present referendum campaign. The problem now for the FIDESZ is that the strong position it once had may be undermined by it over-extending itself with campaigns that ultimately lead to nowhere. Thus, the insistence that the referendum carries a much higher political significance than it actually possesses is nothing more than a repeat of a stale political strategy. The FIDESZ has been continually trying to reinvent itself through different campaigns, often with little success: there was the Good Morning Hungary campaign, culminating in people converging on parliament with their alarm clocks to indicate to Gyurcsany that his time was up; there was the ultimatum for Gyurcsany to step down; the Charter; public speeches by opposition politicians in front of parliament that would run until the government changed (after a few days interest waned and this action also came to an end); and there was the New Majority in where the blue backdrop from the Liberals was used as a means to try and entice unsatisfied voters on the left to gravitate toward the FIDESZ.
Despite all these campaigns and publicity stunts nothing fundamentally changed. Gyurcsany simply ignored the FIDESZ and went about his business. Hence, there is no reason why the same won't happen with the upcoming referendum. Although the government will be forced to scrap the user fees and find ways to fill in the financial gaps from other areas of the budget, it will nonetheless continue to push forward its policies as it sees fit.
As a result of this, the FIDESZ may have over-extended itself by burdening the referendum with too much of a political significance. This stale political strategy is one reason why Viktor Orban, who has been head of the party since its founding some 20 years ago, has only been able to win one election out of five (and even that one he barely won, only with the help of the Independent Smallholders). For many, Orban is a loser and a symbol of the much despised "political elite" in Hungary - politicians who can't seem to let go and who have been peddling their wares for the past fifteen to twenty years. Indeed, a recent study found that one third of Hungarians would be willing to vote for a viable alternative to the Socialist-Liberal left and the FIDESZ-MDF right. It should come as no surprise that within the FIDESZ there have been subtle noises for someone other than Orban to run at the next general election in 2010.
Fear and Intimidation
Given that many are expecting some sort of change as promised by the FIDESZ, coupled with the March 15th anniversary a week later, the authorities have once again resorted to exploiting a climate of fear and intimidation. Molotov cocktails have been thrown at various buildings a couple of times, resulting in a little damage but no injuries. Likewise, the Hungarian Arrow Liberation Army (HALA) has made the headlines on a few occasions. The HALA is seen as responsible for the recent spate of Molotov cocktails and an assault on a former high-ranking member of the Socialist party who had since become a right-wing television commentator. Despite this, the group is largely unknown and has only come to light the past few weeks; many regard it as a front organization run by the secret services.
On the political front, meanwhile, in mid-February the Justice Minister Albert Takacs was replaced by Gyurcsany's right-hand man, Tibor Draskovics. The move caught nearly everyone by surprise. The reason for the change was sketchy, but most agree that it was because Gyurcsany felt that Takacs wasn't tough enough -- especially on the Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary right-wing group. Indeed, as to prove his mettle, Draskovics immediately went about trying to get the Hungarian Guard legally banned. A hearing was initially scheduled for April; Draskovics, however, wasn't satisfied and had the judicial council move the hearing to mid March, between the time of the referendum and the March 15th anniversary. This move by Draskovics drew condemnation from legal authorities and was criticised by the constitutional court as an affront to the independence of the judiciary.
Despite increased concern from many about the activities of the Hungarian Guard, the replacement of Takacs with Draskovics was clearly motivated by the events taking place in March. Takacs was a person who specialised in the judiciary and claimed that despite his opposition to the Hungarian Guard, there was nothing he could do against them as they were a legal organisation. Thus, unless the Hungarian Guard actually did something illegal Takacs could only express his personal views on the organisation, something which he did on several occasions. The move by Draskovics against the Hungarian Guard, therefore, was clearly a politically motivated event. Although to most legal experts the outcome of the trial is a foregone conclusion, it has nevertheless already served its purpose.
Apart from the paranoia on the part of the government and the over-stated significance of the upcoming referendum by the right-wing opposition, there is nothing to indicate that something unusual will happen during the mid-March anniversary in Hungary of the 1848 revolution. Without a doubt, some form of anti-government protest is expected toward the evening of March 15th, but this has become the usual confrontation between a few hardcore protesters and the police ever since the bloody events of October 2006.
In the meantime, the authorities have been made to look as if they are aggressively pursuing the enemy. Some raids were conducted in and around Budapest; police seized computers along with some flour and sugar. According to police sources, the latter was taken because they could be somehow used to make Molotov cocktails. It?s difficult to decide at this point whether one should laugh or cry.