Confidence Man

Weekly Review: Schröder's historic "win-win" gamble has landed the Greens in a "lose-lose" dilemma.

On Friday morning, Germany's governing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens squeaked by one more time. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder needed a simple majority of 334 votes in the Bundestag, Germany's lower house of parliament, to survive a vote of confidence. He got 336. Now, battered and emotionally drained, party leaders prepare to face distraught delegates at their respective conventions this week.

As Harald Neuber reminds Telepolis readers, votes of confidence are a rare event in Germany. Before Friday, only three had ever been called in the history of the Federal Republic. Willy Brandt (SPD) called the first in 1972; Helmut Schmidt (SPD), ten years later; and, just months later, Helmut Kohl used the maneuver to solidify the foundation of his and the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) 16-year reign.

But as late as last weekend, a vote of confidence was the farthest option from any politico's mind. Schröder was calmly sending out signals that he understood the reluctance of those in his own party -- which had never in its 135-year history led the country into war -- and especially that of the Greens -- a party, after all, born in part of the peace movement of the 70s and 80s -- to agree to send 3900 German troops to join US-led forces in Afghanistan (see Off to War). The vote for approval of Germany's largest military adventure since World War II was slated for Thursday and Schröder let it be known that he could live with its passage in the Bundestag based on votes from the conservative opposition. His shaky coalition might well not muster a majority on its own.

As the hours ticked on, however, and critics within the ranks of the SPD and Greens grew louder, their arguments against leaping into the war outlined in point-by-point position papers, it seems to have dawned on Schröder that his leadership, and perhaps more importantly, the perception of his leadership was fading fast. At some point on Monday, the idea of pursuing policies significant enough to shift Germany's role on the international stage without the support of his own government became unacceptable. He decided to link the vote to an even bigger one: the vote of confidence.

That was a first. The three previous votes of confidence had been just that and nothing more: yea or nay on the composition of the government. They had not been linked to a specific issue. A flurry of bizarre repositionings ensued. Both the CDU and the Liberals (FDP) had intended to vote for sending troops but couldn't bring themselves to vote for the continuation of Schröder's government. They could claim their switch was based on disapproval of, say, "red-green" economic policies, but here, Schröder had already scored his first points. The conservatives came off looking as if playing politics was more important to them than their oft-professed loyalty to Germany's allies and, in particular, to the US.

A constitutional technicality meant that the vote would be delayed a day, and throughout the countdown, it became clearer and clearer that Schröder had created a "win-win" situation for himself. Winning the vote would obviously be nice. Schröder would prove that he could play hardball and whip his minions back in line.

But in the long run, losing might have been even better. Schröder would have had a couple of options, but rather than review them all, let's cut to the most attractive: he could call for new elections. As early as January or February. A glance at the current political landscape reveals that he would be extremely well-positioned for such an early date with the voting public. While his own popularity ratings soar, the CDU is in a shambles. Practically the laughing-stock of the country, the party can't even decide on a candidate for chancellor for the election scheduled less than a year away in the first place. The Liberals, in the meantime, are profiting from the CDU's mess, and Schröder has made a point twice in the last week of blessing the FDP with two high-profile meetings with its leadership. Should the "red-green" coalition fall apart, few doubt that "red-yellow" (yellow being the Liberals' color) would be quick to follow.

Meanwhile, a lot can happen between now and next September. Supposing the US doesn't expand its "war on terror" into, say, Iraq (perhaps a rickety supposition), the conflict may eventually settle into the back pages of the papers in much the same way that the still-volatile situation in what was once Yugoslavia has. The issues that Schröder originally campaigned on -- slashing unemployment, "modernizing" the German economy -- would return with a vengeance. Schröder's economic policies made a fine impression when the global economy was booming, but now that the world teeters on the brink of recession, his campaign promises will probably go unfulfilled for quite some time. That's why Schröder would probably have preferred elections sooner rather than later.

So where does all this leave the Greens? Pretty much high and dry. Eight Green parliamentarians had declared their intentions to vote against deployment of German troops, but Schröder's move turned those intentions into kamikaze votes. The end of the week saw the Greens wrestling with the "lose-lose" dilemma Schröder had trapped them into. If they voted their conscience, their role in the government would be finished, one way or the other. If they voted to stay in "power," they would alienate the estimated 70 percent of Green Party members opposed to Germany's involvement in the war.

Following a dramatic all-night meeting that ended early Friday morning, the eight renegades settled on a "Solomon solution": Four would vote yea, the other four, nay. So the Greens have weakly registered their protest while managing, just barely, to cling to their ever-shrinking role in the government. The Green Party congress at the end of this week in Rostock should be pretty raucous, but with 15 Social Democrats also opposed to the idea of German troops in Afghanistan, the SPD's own convention beginning this Monday in Nuremberg will be no picnic, either.

In his Telepolis article, Harald Neuber makes the important point that what got lost this week in all the political maneuvering was the issue that launched all the hoopla in the first place. The war itself, much less Germany's role in it, was treated with nothing more than the lip service parliamentarians deemed immediately necessary. Instead, the debate was almost comically self-referential, what with the government defending its call for a vote on its continued existence and the opposition slamming it.

What's also slipped by almost unnoticed is the fact that Friday's vote sealed the inevitability of the Schröder-Fischer project of catapulting Germany into a larger role in international affairs. If Schröder holds onto power beyond next September, he'll see his project through, with or without Green leader and current foreign minister Joschka Fischer. But even if he loses to the conservatives, the political heirs of Helmut Kohl can be counted on to demand a more visible seat at the global table as well.

The ironic twist here is that Germany spent half a century atoning for two disastrous world wars by remaining subservient to the US; and is now announcing its arrival on the world stage by declaring its "unlimited solidarity" with, guess who, the US. For better or worse, it's for this that history will remember Gerhard Schröder.

Elsewhere

For the Financial Times, it was Schröder's showdown and a confidence trick. The Economist called it Schröder's gamble and, in a piece that also ran in The International Herald Tribune, The New York Times referred to Schröder's tactic as a "game of chicken". "He won," writes Steven Erlanger, "but he did so by humiliating his coalition partner."

The IHT's John Vinocur, though, admires Schröder's "able tactician's hand" and argues that the chancellor has forced "his own parliamentary majority - and effectively the country as a whole - to face the reality that in the US-led campaign against terrorism there are no neutral corners in which America's allies can hide."

The FT also approves -- "he is right to put his job on the line" -- and even argues that he go on "imposing lasting discipline on the coalition." Haig Simonian fills in the background to that editorial, reminding readers that "Mr Schröder is nothing if not a shrewd politician" and that "Germans have become used to cliffhangers under their chancellor," a man "locked in behind-the-scenes power-broking."

It's hardly a surprise, of course, that the World Socialist Web Site offers an entirely different interpretation of the week's events. Schröder, writes Peter Schwartz, is "entering new constitutional ground" by "forcing the will of the chancellor upon parliament." What's more, Schröder and Fischer's insistence on military involvement in this war has nothing to do with Germany's "friendship" with the US, but rather, is "directed at challenging the last remaining superpower in the struggle over raw materials, markets and spheres of influence."

Now there's a view you won't find in your morning paper.