Hungary: The Loser Takes it All

FIDESZ won a two-thirds majority in parliament - Expectations are high and people are impatient

Victor Orban is no doubt a happy man. After waiting for so many years on the sidelines, he finally has his hands firmly gripped on the reins of power. As leader of the Young Democrats (FIDESZ) for the past twenty years, indeed since its inception, he is no longer so young and some argue neither very democratic. Yet finally his time has come; the question now is, time for what.

Victor Orban and the FIDESZ sealed an enormous victory on Sunday securing a much coveted two-thirds majority in parliament. The significance of this huge victory is that it enables the FIDESZ alone to pass any laws it sees fit and even make changes to the constitution. Such a situation is unprecedented in the history of post-communist Hungary. While the Socialist government of Gyula Horn likewise enjoyed a two-thirds majority in parliament back in 1994, the difference between then and now is that Horn's majority was based on a coalition with the liberal Free Democrats. The relationship between the two parties within this coalition was frequently uneasy, hence measures requiring a two-thirds majority often ended up by the wayside.

Coalition problems are something that the FIDESZ doesn't have to worry about – at least in theory. Yet despite the right wing euphoria over his landslide victory, the enormity of Orban's power base is somewhat illusory. Although 68% of the parliament is now controlled by the Young Democrats, in reality the two-thirds threshold had been crossed by only about five or six seats. This means that the opposition only needs to find half a dozen or so turncoats within the governing party in order to stifle major legislation or important constitutional changes.

The likelihood of this happening is real and will no doubt betray the true democratic face of Orban and the FIDESZ. If past experience is anything to go by, then we can't expect to see much democracy in action. The election of the current Hungarian president, Laszlo Solyom, provides a disturbing example. The president of Hungary is elected by parliament, and in Solyom's case his election was a close and nail-biting affair; so much so, that it ultimately rested on a slim majority of only a handful of votes. Fearing that some party members might vote against their candidate, the FIDESZ ordered their members to publicly show how they voted. This action was not only undemocratic but also illegal, as such a vote is supposed to be by secret ballot.

While such undemocratic actions within parliament may have raised a few eyebrows, ultimately the FIDESZ wasn't sanctioned for what clearly ran against the very foundation of the Hungarian constitution. This is because such infringements are not considered extraordinary. The notion of a backbencher is unheard of in Hungarian politics. Indeed, the sanctioning of political renegades (usually by means of paying a hefty fine) is seen as normal and is practiced by all political parties in Hungary; in fact, it's explicitly worked into their respective party constitutions.

Winners and Losers

Without a doubt the Young Democrats dealt a devastating blow to their rivals, namely to the Socialists on the left. If Hungary employed an archaic electoral system called first-past-the-post, as employed in the UK, Canada, and other Anglo-Saxon countries, then the FIDESZ would have won all but three seats. This would have represented some 99.3% of all seats in parliament. Fortunately, Hungary employs a rather modern, representative electoral system; hence minority voices have a chance to be heard in parliament.

For Orban personally, this year's vote caps a two decade effort at finally winning an election. Although the FIDESZ was able to form a government in 1998, Orban initially lost to Horn in the first round. It was only through a political alliance with the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Independent Smaller Holders (both of which have been since thrown on to the trash heap of Hungarian politics) that Orban and the Young Democrats succeeded in winning the election in the second round.

The failure of Orban to win an election outright, especially over the past eight years, had led some to question his ability to lead the FIDESZ. Yet his authoritarian style of governance within the party is the main reason why he was able to remain in Hungarian politics for so long, despite being a chronic loser. In fact, his loss to Peter Medgyessy in the 2002 election was seen as incomprehensible given the fact that Medgyessy was clearly a weak opponent. After such a loss most had thought that Orban should have stepped back and made way for a new generation.

The same feeling was apparent after he lost the election in 2006 to Ferenc Gyurcsany. Although Gyurcsany was personally a stronger opponent than Medgyessy, he and the Socialists were laden with such political baggage that prior to the election it was felt by most that the FIDESZ would easily win. Their surprising loss was such a shock to Orban that Gyurcsany subsequently became his nemesis. Fortunately for Orban, the revelation a few months after the election that Gyurcsany secretly admitted to having "lied day and night" to voters (the infamous Balatonoszod Speech) had enabled him to carry on with his struggle for power. This struggle soon turned into an obsession, so much so that the political conflicts in parliament between left and right appeared more of a personal rivalry between Gyurcsany and Orban.

The ability of Gyurcsany to hold on to power despite serious pitfalls early on had clearly driven Orban almost to the point of insanity. He tried everything short of a coup d'état. The dismantling of a cordon fence around parliament by him and other leaders of the FIDESZ, while seen as a form of civil disobedience buy some, was seen as an act of desperation by others.

Eventually, the financial crisis of 2008 heralded the end of Gyurcsany and the rise of Orban. Although the country was in bad shape before the crisis, the events of 2008 made it impossible for the Socialists to pretend that things weren't as bad as they seemed. The left in Hungary lost all forms of legitimacy and simply fell apart. The pathetic state of the Socialists was best exemplified by a campaign poster during the second round of this year's election. It featured the standard fare of the Hungarian tricolor in the background and the picture of a Socialist candidate in the foreground, together with the following, simple sentence: "Please vote for me."

Apart from the utter defeat of the Socialists, another apparent loser in the election – especially the second round – was the far right JOBBIK party. The fact that it had made it into parliament close behind the Socialists was overshadowed by the expectation that the party would actually finish ahead of the Socialists. In the end it obtained more or less the number of seats that pollsters had predicted that it would get. However, it failed to secure the 50 seats it had hoped for, falling short by just 3. If the JOBBIK would have been able to get 50 seats then it would have been able to run its own candidate for president. It's another story altogether if this candidate would have stood much of a chance, but in any case only the FIDESZ and the Socialists will now be able to put forward candidates for president.

All this is not to say that the only winner in this year's election was the FIDESZ. Another winner was an emerging green party called the LMP. The LMP is a Hungarian acronym for "Politics Can Be Different". A relative newcomer to the scene, the LMP surprised many by not only making it into parliament but by doing so with a relatively strong showing. It appears to have brought a fresh breeze into the stale air of Hungarian politics. Occupying a vacuum on the left wing of the political spectrum, the LMP already appears to be a serious rival to the Socialists. For the moment observers are unsure of what to think of the LMP. Some, however, have already voiced their disappointment with the party noting that they seemed to be already sitting on their laurels from the first round, being comparatively inert during the second.

Silent Promises

During his speech following the vote on Sunday, Orban framed his victory as a political revolution. He also stressed the historic significance of the FIDESZ win, noting that nowhere in Europe had a party won with such a large level of support. What he had failed to mention, however, was also that nowhere in Europe was an election as empty and boring as in Hungary. There were no political debates at all and issues were clearly absent.

The one thing that Orban and the FIDESZ had learned from the past eight years is to say little and promise nothing. Orban himself is an excellent public speaker, but a lousy debater. This was apparent in the previous two elections where his performance apparently did more harm than good. As a result, the FIDESZ decided this time round not to take part in any public debate and avoided mentioning issues at all. This position was strictly reinforced when a tactical mistake was made early on in the campaign and the issue of pension reform had slipped out. This error led to a slight drop in support as the party scrambled to contain the damage.

Ironically, while the FIDESZ and the right wing justifiably criticized the former Socialists for duping voters in previous elections by lying to them about their program, the same sort of criticism can be now leveled at the FIDESZ in the present. In essence, voters had been duped by not being told anything. In the end, the result is the same: people are not getting what they had hoped or voted for.

Expectations are high given the present state of affairs. The country is facing massive problems: a high national debt and budget deficit coupled with record high unemployment has rendered the country more or less insolvent. In addition to this, the backlash to the financial crisis of 2008 is only now starting to make itself felt: some 20,000 people face eviction or repossession in the coming weeks, with many more soon to follow. A government moratorium on repossessions has already twice been imposed and it's highly unlikely that the problem can be avoided any further.

The FIDESZ is quite aware of this but has simply decided to ignore the problem. Instead, for the next few months the new government will be able to divert public attention by focusing its efforts on tackling corruption and public security issues. There is no question that these are also big problems which need to be dealt with, however the fear is that while the focus of public attention is elsewhere, measures and policies that run counter to what people thought they voted for will be discreetly pushed through.

This can already been seen in the first interview that Orban gave the day after the election. When talking about reforming the tax system, the FIDESZ leader alluded to how complicated it was to fill out a tax return, and noted that it should be as short and simple as a beer coaster. In effect, what he was referring to was his desire to introduce a flat tax in Hungary, something which Orban had never talked about in public and an issue which the majority of Hungarians are against. Big business and the IMF, on the other hand, have been pushing Hungary for years to adopt such a regime. The previous government, while it toyed with idea, didn't dare introduce it because of the obvious public backlash that it would cause.

The same goes for tax cuts. While tax cuts are generally treated as a universal axiom of sorts, in actual fact it's not. Tax cuts are primarily for the benefit of the rich. Not only this, at a time of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment it's hard to see where the government will find the resources to compensate for tax cuts. The common response is that cutting taxes will invigorate the economy which, in turn, will put more people to work. This will then lead to an increase in government revenue.

All this sounds nice in theory but has yet to be proven in practice. Moreover, whereas such a stimulus can no doubt work, it nevertheless requires time. That is, tax cuts don't mean that new jobs will immediately follow. The decisive question is what will make up for the shortfall in revenue until this stimulus actually kicks in. Financial experts within the FIDESZ already have an answer for this: while taxes won't cut deep, they will be broad. As with the notion of a flat tax, the poor will end up being be hit hardest by such broad tax reforms.

While financial experts within the FIDESZ have talked about tax reform, no mention was made on the status of other taxes introduced by the outgoing government that were highly criticized by the Young Democrats and reviled by the public. Among these is the introduction of sales tax applied to cafeteria and vacation vouchers, as well as a tax on donations. In the case of the latter, many foundations and charities have complained that their activities have been severely affected as a result. It's most likely these taxes will remain since they don't affect big business as much and the government is in need of revenue. Yet when it comes to the idea of reform and easing the tax burden, it's precisely the revocation of these measures that people had in mind.

Changing Faces

Among the many phrases used by the FIDESZ during the election (such as "Judgment Day", "The Time is Here"), Orban's promise to make Hungary "the most competitive and dynamic country within the region" is perhaps the most empty. For one, it's nothing more than a cheap copy of the European Commission's stated objective for the Lisbon Agenda ("to make Europe the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world by 2010"). Indeed, if it's anything like the Lisbon Agenda then his plans too will end in dismal failure.

While Orban's remark on making Hungary the most dynamic country within the region sounds harmless, supporters of the FIDESZ (especially those on the Hungarian right who presently view Orban as a godsend that will secure the nation's identity and culture) perhaps should view this statement with a little concern. It could very well be an indication that Orban and the FIDESZ are about to shed the populist skin that brought them to the pinnacle of power. As the German poet and dramatist Friedrich Schiller commented in his 1783 play Fiesco: "The Moor has done his work, the Moor can go."

This isn't the first time that Orban and the FIDESZ went through an identity change. When the Young Democrats first formed in the dying days of communism, they presented themselves as a party of young idealists, much like the LMP of today. An example of their idealism was the fact that no-one over the age of 35 could be a member of the party. It goes without saying that when Orban and others approached this age limit they simply got rid of it. Along with their idealism they also got rid of their jeans and scruffy look, put on suits and delved into a luxury car business.

At the beginning, many felt that the Young Democrats were simply a younger version of the Free Democrats, and thus categorized them as a left wing party. Their actions also seemed to not suit those on the right. For example, twenty years ago when the speaker of the house called for a minute of silence with respect to the 70th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon (the peace treaty at the end of the First World War which Hungarians feel is unjust and a national tragedy), Orban and the FIDESZ walked out of parliament in protest.

Unable to make inroads on the left, which was dominated by both the Socialists and the Free Democrats, the Young Democrats gravitated to the right, picking up remnants of other small right wing parties blown apart from infighting along the way. Hence, the FIDESZ is now more of a front organization comprising of not only the Young Democrats but also the Christian Democrats, the Smallholders, and renegade members of the conservative MDF.

Indubitably, the real test for Orban and the FIDESZ will come on July 4th which will mark the 90th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon. It can be expected that the far-right JOBBIK will use the occasion to introduce into the new parliament a measure to mark the date as a day of national mourning and to have the Soviet war memorial on Freedom Square removed, replaced by a monument to the Treaty of Trianon which originally stood there prior to the Second World War.

How Orban and the FIDESZ will handle this is significant not only from an internal political standpoint. The FIDESZ had done its best to try and curry favor with the Hungarian minorities outside the country's borders, in areas that used to belong to Hungary before the Treaty of Trianon. In fact, Orban went so far as to try and push for dual citizenship and had made it one of the first priorities of the new government. Neighboring countries, however, especially Slovakia and Romania, are deeply concerned about this. In Slovakia, where parliamentary elections will take place on June 12th, the victory of the FIDESZ could lead to a rise in Jan Slota's far right SNS.

Having got what they wanted, that is, a two-thirds majority in parliament, the FIDESZ now has the unenviable task of trying to reconcile otherwise irreconcilable differences. In many respects, it's clear that the FIDESZ will not be able to live up to its right wing populist stance and rhetoric, and thereby fulfill people's expectations. Orban's conciliatory approach toward big business, the European Union, and international institutions such as the IMF are indicative of this.

Likewise, foreign observers, many of whom previously were skeptical or even hostile to Orban and the FIDESZ, welcomed news of his victory noting that with such a large majority he would be able to finally push through much needed reforms. This, in effect, betrays the view outside investors have of Hungary: in the end, it's all the same who is in power, as long as they are able to force through an agenda that people don't want but that big business desperately needs.

Between the Lines

One can't accuse Orban of outright lying in the same way that his nemesis, Ferenc Gyurcsany, had done before. Nevertheless, in retrospect one can discern the careful way in which Orban used his words in order to conceal his true intentions. A case in point is that of medical care. The FIDESZ jumped on the bandwagon of public dissatisfaction with the previous government's plans to privatize the medical sector and even organized a referendum against it. During the referendum campaign, Orban made it clear: he was against any attempt to sell the buildings, but cryptically added that private capital is needed to invest in the provision of services to make medical care more modern and efficient.

What the vast majority of FIDESZ supporters didn't realize is that Orban was basically talking about the same thing as the government: support for privatized medical care. The issue of privatizing the state medical sector has little or nothing to do with buildings and equipment but with the provision of services. Orban made it sound as if investors would simply throw money into the medical sector without expecting anything in return. Such a view is both foolhardy and naive. Private capital is first and foremost concerned with making a profit. It's this profit oriented approach which critics of privatized health services complain about, fearing that cost considerations will take precedence in determining the course of treatment.

Although during this year's election campaign some mention was made of "saving health care", the FIDESZ never elaborated on what this really means. Most people are quite clear on what it means to them: undoing the damage which has so far been done by the previous government. Yet Orban and the FIDESZ have been conspicuously silent about whether they would reinstate the number of beds taken away, reopen closed institutions, etc.

For Orban, his path to power has been made easy by blaming everything on the previous government, and without a doubt thorny issues such as health care privatization can be easily blamed on the Socialists. Yet not all such issues can be attributed to the previous administration. Some of the problems which are now bearing fruit can be attributed to the seeds planted by Orban himself during the coalition government he formed in 1998.

The most obvious of this is the question of the foreign ownership of land. It was Orban himself who signed the initial moratorium which will now soon expire. While he may have commented at the time that "there is life outside the EU", he nevertheless signed the Treaty of Nice and was subsequently criticized by many in Hungary for giving in too easily and not negotiating a longer grace period as other countries had done, such as Poland.

When the question of extending the moratorium became an issue last year, Orban made it clear that the FIDESZ would not allow foreigners to buy land. This utterance has since come back to haunt him and was one of the questions raised during his first interview following the election. Yet like all his other answers, it was shrouded in ambiguity.

What Orban did mention was his desire to solve the issue of foreign land ownership along the lines of the models employed in Austria and France. As with the flat tax, this is something entirely new and unexpected to voters, and something which no doubt would have made people think twice before voting for the FIDESZ. Hungarians have a fear of foreign "models", as the issue of pension reform clearly demonstrated. Indeed, talk of a Swedish model for pension reform put the FIDESZ in hot water and caused a slight drop in their support early on in the campaign.

People's aversion to foreign models is in many ways understandable: the crisis of capitalism that Hungary is going through is primarily due to such models. Hence, the electoral success of the right wing in Hungary can be directly attributed to the desire of finding a "Hungarian solution" to the country's many problems. The talk now of foreign models clearly contradicts this early position.

There is no doubt that many more surprises lie in store. Even within the FIDESZ discrepancies have begun to appear. For instance, a few days before the second round a senior FIDESZ official said the new government will not cut taxes this year. Laszlo Kover, the head of the FIDESZ election campaign, said that business taxes and other contributions would not be reduced this year and employment tax would only be eased in the next two years. Orban soon contradicted Kover reaffirming the promise that the Young Democrats made while in opposition that they would cut taxes soon after assuming power.

For now, the euphoria of having finally truncated the Socialists has diverted people's attention away from seriously reflecting on these and other issues. Yet the FIDESZ is quite aware of what lies ahead, and moves are already underway to help soften the blow. This is can be best seen through the propaganda arms of the FIDESZ such as the Magyar Nemzet (print media), Lanchid Radio (radio), and the Hir TV (television). For example, a recent article in the Magyar Nemzet seemed to herald the FIDESZ's abandonment of its strong right wing rhetoric by pointing out that modern Hungarian conservatives are patriots that don't lament the nation state.

In other cases, a propaganda offensive has begun in order to justify moves that people are outright opposed to. One of these is an attempt to merge Hungary's two public television stations, Hungarian Television (MTV) and Duna TV. In the case of the latter, potential plans by the previous government led to such opposition that an online petition was signed by thousands, among them several high profile personalities including politicians, academics, artists, athletes, and others. Many Hungarians regard Duna TV as important because it caters to Hungarian minorities living beyond the country's borders.

For outside institutions such as the IMF, however, Duna TV represents a waste of government money and resources and should be merged with the MTV to create a single streamlined state-sponsored television channel. From what can be discerned in the Magyar Nemzet, a subtle smear campaign against Duna TV appears to be already underway, as exemplified in a recent article which attempts to link the television station with the former Socialists and corruption.

Knowing that such moves will lead to a backlash is something that the FIDESZ is undoubtedly preparing for. Plans to increase the size of electoral districts, thereby reducing the number of elected representatives, have already been put forward and are expected to be rushed through in time for this year's municipal elections in October.

In Hungary, municipal elections are routinely held in the autumn following parliamentary elections in the spring. These elections often serve as a quick test for governments. A poignant example was in 2006 when people's anger and dissatisfaction with the Gyurcsany government following the Balatonoszod Speech was such that the Socialists were almost totally wiped out.

The idea to reduce parliament by half as well as cut the number of electoral zones for municipalities is actually nothing new and has been on the agenda of successive governments since 1994. It is a move which has been repeatedly urged by the IMF and other outside institutions as one way to reduce costs, cut bureaucracy, and improve efficiency.

While the idea of making government smaller seems to make sense financially, a smaller parliament also means less democracy. Fewer representatives in parliament means fewer voices are heard and fewer debates. Indeed, if the government wants to be totally cost efficient it can reduce the parliament all the way to one individual – Victor Orban himself. Not only this, the plan to quickly introduce these changes in time for this year's municipal elections is obviously a way of stemming opposition to the new government. Merging municipal electoral zones will dilute potential areas of opposition and mask the true extent of people's dissatisfaction with the government.

The End of the Beginning

Unlike most political parties, the FIDESZ has a telescopic vision of the future. While most parties are concerned with the shape they will be in four or five year's time, the Young Democrats take this for granted and are already looking down the road twenty years. Along these lines, Orban feels confident enough to make superfluous and vague promises, such as creating one million new jobs – over the next ten years.

For most people this is not enough. Expectations are high and people are impatient. Some within the FIDESZ are aware of this, and have been trying to backtrack from comments made while in opposition that when they are in power they will bring the country into good shape in relatively quick order. Others, meanwhile, don't seem to be too bothered by the fact that solutions to the country's myriad woes won't be quick or painless. They feel that they have dealt a knock out blow to the Socialists from which they will have a hard time to recover.

Although the FIDESZ victory was in many ways historic, the results nonetheless betray certain tendencies that could surprise them in the next election if they aren't careful. Aside from the fact that a single party gained a two-thirds majority in parliament, what was also unprecedented in this year's election is that it marked a sharp increase in the number of newcomers to parliament. In other words, people are tired of the old timers and are looking for a fresh change. This year's election effectively swept out most of the old generation, with one exception – Victor Orban.

The fact that he still personally represents the politics of old is clearly a point of attack for the opposition. The FIDESZ also mustn't forget that the LMP has taken over the position that it had once held long ago. The LMP is now the face of youth and a viable alternative to the stale politics of old, something which the FIDESZ had prided itself on before. Not only this, the advantage that the LMP has over the FIDESZ is that it has firm roots in green politics. In fact, FIDESZ's Achilles Heel is that its environmental policy is almost non-existent.

To the right of the FIDESZ is another challenge – the JOBBIK. If the Young Democrats do shed their right wing rhetoric they will then do so at the expense of their right wing supporters, the very same people who gave the FIDESZ its vast majority. It goes without saying that the JOBBIK will provoke the FIDESZ on this point. As one observer noted, as a radical party the JOBBIK is like a shark; it has to keep moving or it will die. Being a radical party, its support comes from those who are eager for action. If the JOBBIK simply sits back and becomes complacent with its parliamentary work, then it will certainly follow in the footsteps of the Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIEP) of Istvan Csurka, once considered a right-wing threat to Hungarian democracy and which has since faded to insignificance.

In the end, the future of how well the FIDESZ will perform in the next few years will have little to do with what happens within the country but with what goes on without. Hungary is at the mercy of outside forces as its economy functions in the role of a vassal state, and there is no indication that the FIDESZ or outside institutions such as the IMF are willing to change this status. As a result, the country's future is inextricably linked to what happens within the Europe Union. Given that the European Union is in a state of crisis with Greece and other countries threatening to drag member states down the road to ruin, Hungary can look forward to rough times ahead.