Identity Crisis
The attitude of Central and Eastern Europeans on the prospect of war and the notion that the region is now part of a "new Europe"
Ever since the fall of communism, Central and Eastern Europe has been undergoing a change of identity. This struggle to find oneself in the post cold war world order hasn't always been so easy for some countries. Czechoslovakia no longer exists, as the two main ethnic groups decided shortly after the Velvet Revolution to part company as the Czech Republic and Slovakia respectively. Likewise, for many within the former country of Yugoslavia a change of identity has not always been so peaceful. And of course, in Russia what has been difficult for many was not only the change of name and shape of the country, but the realisation that their "great" nation was not so great after all, as exemplified by the loss of their superpower status.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's reference to the region as the "New Europe" was not greeted enthusiastically by people throughout the region. Indeed, some feel a little uncomfortable about this categorisation. For one, it's precisely toward "old Europe" that "new Europe" hopes to join. Moreover, it rubs in their face an uncomfortable truth: that they are mere vassals of Washington.
No one within Central and Eastern Europe takes Rumsfeld's assertions seriously. It's obvious that the notion of a "new Europe" is a farce, and governments in the region know it. Statistics say it all: the combined GDP of new Europe (that is, all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) is 962 billion dollars as opposed to old Europe (France and Germany) which stands at 3.68 trillion dollars. In terms of military power, the region pales by comparison. The number of military troops in old Europe stands at 582,000 while all of new Europe has only 538,000. Likewise, there is a vast discrepancy in military spending between old and new, with the former at 85.3 billion dollars while the latter can only muster 8.4 billion. This is supposed to be where the axis of power is now shifting in Europe?
Despite recent proclamations from some government leaders of their support for the US stance toward Iraq, most people within the region don't agree with America's foreign policy -- in particular, George Bush's aggressive style of diplomacy. Indeed, there's a discernible split between the views of Central and Eastern European rulers and those over whom they rule.
In Hungary, there has been considerable public concern because of prime minister Peter Medgyessy's decision to sign the open letter pledging solidarity with the US, not in the least because it may have been an illegal act according to Hungarian law. When it comes to issues of war and peace, parliament must be consulted and any government action or policy must be approved by a majority vote of at least two-thirds. Not only doesn't the government have this majority, but parliament wasn't even consulted in the first place.
Aside from this, Hungarian opposition to the war can be clearly seen in public reaction to the American base at Taszar in the south of the country, where "Iraqi and other Arab volunteers" are being trained for a purpose that no-one is yet certain of. According to a recent official survey conducted toward the end of January, two-thirds of respondents aren't happy with the American training facility at Taszar feeling that it poses some sort of security risk. A same number also claim that they haven't been given enough information by the government of who exactly is at the base and for what purpose. This feeling transcends party loyalties: over 70% of opposition supporters feel they haven't been adequately informed while over 60% of government supporters feel the same way.
Yet not everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe is there such public anxiety toward a war with Iraq. In Romania, almost half the population are in favor of military intervention, which places Romania in second position of the most ardent supporters for war, just after the US.
For the most part, however, Central and Eastern Europeans are generally opposed to military action. In Bulgaria, many view the upcoming conflict with mixed feelings. Although not really opposing the rush to war, there are voices of caution which maintain that all peaceful efforts should be exhausted first. Both Estonians and Russians share a similar view.
There are a variety of reasons why government leaders tend to lean one way and their citizenry the other. Some seem to be simply resigned to fate. Hence, the political will of the ruling party in Bulgaria is to support the US vision of a new world, rather than to keep neutral. Most politicians in Bulgaria think that there's no way to remain neutral in the upcoming war, so there's no point in even trying.
Others, however, are walking a very fine line in trying to keep everyone happy. In Romania, the government hasn't taken an official position yet with regards to the Iraq issue, but expects to do so by February 10th. The government is being very cautious in its response for two reasons: first, Romania has been invited to join NATO and doesn't want to jeopardise its membership bid and, second, public opinion is much more divided than during the campaign in Afghanistan.
In one way or another, most countries feel indebted to the US and therefore pursue a policy which is clearly not in their national interest. It also mustn't be forgotten that the US was well aware of the situation over Iraq several months -- even years -- before, and had thus taken appropriate action to woo over potential supporters and "allies".
This means of garnering support has been applied not only on a governmental level, but on a personal one as well. The Hungarian prime minister, for example, was invited to Washington shortly after his election last year and received royal treatment. His first class reception in the US, which was dwelled upon by the Hungarian media, may have inflated national pride and the Hungarian ego, but in retrospect it was laying the groundwork for a US lobby partner in Europe. What is more, considering that the prime minister had several skeletons in his closet, most notably a contested election and the revelation that during the communist regime, aside from his official role as deputy prime minister and finance minister in the last communist government, he was also a counter-intelligence officer, the blessing of Washington gave him and his government a certain measure of legitimacy. In return, it appears not only was Hungary to be a lapdog of US foreign policy in Europe, but also would take a more active role in aiding George Bush's military ambitions, as can be seen with the American base at Taszar.
Aside from those who, for one reason or another, feel indebted to the US and thus find themselves supporting the US hard-line policy on Iraq, some have a clear, ulterior motive for supporting the US. Bulgaria has some economic interests in Iraq, mainly a huge unpaid debt which Iraq still owes the country. Therefore, by throwing their lot in with the Americans Bulgaria hopes to perhaps be able to secure an early repayment of this debt.
Finally, it's unclear exactly why some governments support the US position. Vaclav Havel, who is a respected leader for his moral stance both inside and outside the Czech Republic, had also thrown in his lot with Hungary and Poland when he signed the open letter of support for the US. For many this was a shock as they thought the Czech president would have exercised better judgement; others, however, put it down to mere political expediency.
Given the rift between the rulers and ruled in Central and Eastern Europe, it's surprising that the anti-war movement within the region is so silent. Yet much of this has to do with the indifference of public opinion. In Bulgaria, the whole Iraq issue is considered "outside our area" as Bulgarian society faces serious internal problems. Moreover, the Bulgarian anti-war movement is not really big in numbers, albeit a great number of prominent figures have been signing petitions against the rush to war. Past legacies may also play a part. As one observer remarked, there is a lingering feeling of guilt for the past, as Bulgaria was considered by many as "the little brother" of the former USSR.
Yet the absence of anti-war protests also has a lot to do with fear and intimidation. Despite official slogans of democracy and freedom, old habits die hard and the police remain a heavy-handed arm of the government.
In some cases, anti-war protests have been planned but were subsequently banned by the police. In Hungary, the group "Civilians for Peace" planned a demonstration for mid-February but were refused permission by the police. Later, when the group vowed to challenge the decision in court, the police relented saying that the demonstration can be held but not along the route protesters wish to take, this despite the fact that the same route has been used by other demonstrations in the past without any problem.
Meanwhile, the media throughout Central and Eastern Europe has done nothing more than spew the official line from Washington. Protests elsewhere in Europe and the US have been rarely mentioned, if at all. And the EU rift caused by the US lobby within Europe has been played down.
In the end, the longer it takes for war to start the worse it will be for the politicians of "new Europe", as inconsistent government policies become more and more apparent. In addition to this, it's not certain that the public malaise will last, and that anti-war protests will soon be heard on the streets of Central and Eastern Europe as well. For this reason, many politicians within the region are no doubt hoping that the whole war business will be done with soon and swiftly. But as one person from Romania noted, "let's not rush. We have all the time in the world."