"Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"

Spain's September 11 ... and why it wasn't ETA

It was the unbelievable horror: 13 bombs exploding in a train full of passengers during rush hour. More than 190 people killed, more than 1200 wounded. The analogy became clear: March 11, 2004, three days before the Spanish general election, is now Spain's September 11. And the Spanish officials proved to be very quick in their search for the perpetrator: ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna1), who has killed 837 people since 1968 during its armed campaign. It was founded in 1959 with the aim of creating an independent homeland in Spain's Basque region.

1. The failure of the blame game

March 11, 2004 got the label as the most brutal terror attack of ETA since 1987, when 21 people had been killed in Barcelona. The outgoing Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, who himself once became a target in 1995 (he was the leader of the opposition at that time) when ETA tried to assassinate him with a car bomb, gave a tough message on TV, while the Home Office Minister, Angel Acebes, was quoted saying that there was no doubt that ETA was behind the attack. The election campaign was brought to a stand-still by all parties.

The confusion on whether ETA was behind the attack or not started quickly, too: One El-Pais correspondent, José Luis Barberia, stated that he had no doubt that ETA was behind the attack since the attack clearly showed ETA's weakness and their common tactics. Unfortunately, another El-Pais correspondent, Jose Comas, made the exact opposite claim, namely, that he was convinced that ETA was not behind the attack .

As the day went on, more and more "rumor" was spread that Al-Kaida was behind the attack. The Spanish police found a stolen lorry with seven detonators in it, together with a tape which had extracts of the Koran on it. It was also reported (see for example: The Financial Times, 11.03.04) that the Arabic-speaking paper "El Kuds el Arabi" (based in London) has published a letter from Al-Kaida in which the organization claimed to be behind the attack. Thus, the Spanish government made a step back and wouldn't rule out an Al-Kaida attack anymore.

The reason why ETA wasn't behind these attacks is quite simple. ETA could not have done it: It goes back to Brian Jenkin's old "aphorism": "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead". This paper tries to make the case for that argument.

2. "ETA, kampora!": frustrated, weakened, isolated

Until the end of 1999 the future for ETA and its political wing, Batasuna (formerly: "Herri Batasuna"), seemed promising. The party leader, Arnaldo Otegi was already compared2 with the leader of Irish Republicanism, Gerry Adams:

No one embodies Batasuna's ambiguity more than its leader, Arnaldo Otegi, himself a former Eta hitman. For a moment during ETA's 14-month truce, which ended in December 1999, Mr Otegi was considered as a possible Gerry Adams whose bloody credentials gave him the clout to bring the gunmen to the negotiating table.

It might sound cynical, but at the moment, however, it is more likely that Arnaldo Otegi is going to be treated like Osama bin Laden. The party is banned and ETA is substantially weakened and isolated. How could such a development occur?

There were two "peak experiences" at the end of the 1990s which had led to cross-party talks and serious negotiations between Batasuna and the Spanish government: The first was the kidnapping and killing of popular Basque councilor Miguel Angel Blanco in July 1997. It sparked national outrage bringing an estimated six million Spaniards onto the streets. This massive show of opposition and hostility towards political violence came unexpectedly for ETA and proved crucial in their willingness to declare a ceasefire in 1998 and to enter talks with the Spanish government.

The second peak experience was the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland in April 1998. Most time of its existence, ETA has always been something like the small nephew of the IRA. There have always been regular contacts and Batasuna has been "trained" by Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, for a strategy on negotiation with the government. On September 18th, 1998 ETA announced its first indefinite ceasefire since its campaign of violence began. Consequently, in May 1999 the first meeting between ETA and the Spanish government happened in Zurich (Switzerland). However, in August 1999 Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar questioned ETA's willingness for peace and demanded a proof for its commitment. Sadly, in November 1999 the separatist group announced an end to its 14-month ceasefire in a Basque newspaper, blaming the lack of progress in talks with the Spanish Government.

The resurfacing violence led to a process of alienation of the Basque people from militant nationalism and a further isolation of ETA. At the local government election in May 2001, Batasuna's vote was crushed; they lost half of their seats. The following years 2002 and 2003 came out as bad years for ETA and Batasuna.

On May 5th 2002, the Aznar government passed a new law in parliament with its implicit goal to outlaw Batasuna. In August 2002, High Court judge Garzon suspended Batasuna for three years on the grounds that it is part of ETA, which he declares "guilty of crimes against humanity". In March 2003, Spain's Supreme Court banned Batasuna permanently in response to a government request. It was the first time since Franco died in 1975 that a political party had been banned in Spain. The Spanish authorities made a big "reactionary punch" on Batasuna: On August 26th, 2002, their offices in Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastián were raided and closed. Batasuna's headquarter in Pamplona had been closed the night before. In November 2003, the Spanish police arrested 12 suspected ETA leaders in a series of raids, whereas in December the French Police recaptured suspected ETA logistics chief Ibon Fernandez Iradi.

A common feature of today's Basque country and a visible sign for ETA's isolation have become the "anti-ETA demonstrations": Mass rallies with tens of thousands of people demanding the dissolution of the armed separatist group. On October 22nd, 2002, for example, a rally was convened by the Basque regional government, run by the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) which stands for Basque independence through peaceful means. The procession was headed by eight members of the party's youth wing, carrying a banner which read "ETA, kampora" -- Basque for "ETA, disappear." Bilbao municipal police estimated the attendance at the march as 60,000 though some reports placed the figure over 120,000.

3. Aznar's "internal pre-emptive strike" and the paradox of repression

However, the game isn't over yet. At the moment, ETA might be weakened substantially, but it is also erratic and unpredictable. The end of the ceasefire was followed by a period of internal re-organization and the development of a new strategy. It was highly significant that the moderate dared to appeal to Spain's Constitutional Court against Aznar's law passed in May 2002 which led to the ban of Batasuna. The PNV's argument was profound: It was a warning that such a law could lead to a political radicalization in the thinking of (moderate) Basque nationalism. Given that Batasuna only received around ten percent of the vote at the local elections in 2001, the PNV's fear was a stabilization and integration of Batasuna encouraged by central government's hostility.

But Aznar made no attempts in considering an alternative to his policy. By the very contrast he proved to be prepared to go even further, when he used the term "internal pre-emptive strikes": At a speech to the leadership of the Spanish defense forces on October 20th, 2003, he called on them to be prepared for "preventive actions". Being questioned in Parliament, Aznar reinforced his view by saying that a pre-emptive strike would not only be legitimized, but was also a duty for government against external and internal threats. The daily newspaper El Pais was convinced that his reference to an "internal threat" was made towards ETA and - in the same context - reported of heavily-armed paratrooper's training missions of the Spanish defense forces in Basque villages.

It might be helpful for the Spanish government to expand their scope to Northern Ireland and learn from the experiences (and failures) of the British government3:

When McGuinness became a grandfather, the Prime Minister warmly shook his hand and later wrote him a message of congratulations. The Spanish government's action is on an emotional level understandable, as ETA's futile bombings go on. But the Irish lesson is that the authorities must, whatever the provocations, patiently keep looking for signs of movement and flexibility. The strategy of attempting to anathematise the republican community did not work: it was too large, had too strong a tradition and had too much pride. In Spain as in Ireland, it is hardly likely that such a community will simply give in.

Madrid sees the Basque demands for self-determination as a direct attack on its constitution. It fears that granting a free vote on the issue would lead to the dismantling of the state in a country that already grants its autonomous regions wide-ranging executive powers. In Madrid's view there is, therefore, little to discuss with Batasuna, which is perhaps why the 14-month ceasefire, which ETA ended in 1999 after the peak of expectations engendered by the "Irish model", was doomed. The truce was the fruit of a pact with the moderate PNV, which to Madrid's alarm has been "radicalized" by the experience and for the first time speaks clearly in favor of independence. Madrid, therefore, hopes that by banning Batasuna it will turn the PNV back to its former position. A security policy will solve the rest of the puzzle. ETA is much weaker than the Provisional IRA4:

The Spanish security forces now believe that they can finish off the terrorist group. That remains to be seen, but the threat of splinter groups in Ulster will also remind them that it only takes a few fanatics to keep old wounds open.

And the Spanish government should never forget that in 1969, the period preceding the outbreak of civil war in Ireland, the IRA was even weaker then ETA is now: demoralized after a failed border campaign, lost many combatants and supporters and had only around 60 weapons left. It was the British government's harsh counter-insurgency strategy (emergency powers, internment without trial et al.) which proves to become so counter-productive and an example for the "paradox of repression": aimed at defeating the Provisionals, it "unleashed" them!

4. The new "senselessness" of international terrorism: No political message, no meaning, no target selection?

One of Germany's leading terrorism expert, Rolf Tophoven, claimed that it was the (national) context which suggested that ETA was behind the attacks. In disagreeing with that claim, I would argue that it was the international context which explains why ETA wasn't behind the attack. This argument needs some exploration:

Herfried Münkler5, a political scientist at the Humboldt-University of Berlin, recently elaborated a new trend within the context of international terrorism and Al-Kaida: Since a period of ten years there is a recognizable "strategic switch": The role of ideology has been diminished, there is just one simple aim: do as much damage as possible. It is a pure, clandestine strategy and the pictures of March 11 in Madrid give evidence for what Münkler would call a modern "havoc war" (Verwüstungskrieg), in which international terrorism is engaged in.

Thus, the international context as a backdrop gives reason for yet another Al Kaida attack - this time in Madrid. The argument could be made that the "September 11 attack" could have been even "worsened" by an Al-Kaida attack on a nuclear plant or an energy supplier. However, just consider the economic damage that followed the damage of the "property". The attack on the twin towers caused massive economic disruption.

We might ask the question now: What about "domestic" terrorism (armed groups)?

The Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams reacted to September 11 by stating that Osama bin Laden is discrediting all "progressive struggles" world-wide: "Of course, one person's freedom fighter, one person's patriot, is another person's terrorist." Adams said it was "dreadful" that there were wars and conflicts: "But I believe that people have the right to defend themselves and nations have the right to defend themselves."6

The events of September 11 have put enormous pressure on groups with a "nationalist" agenda pursuing their (perceived) right for independence or self-determination with the method of armed struggle. There is a completely new dynamic for these "progressive struggles" now: If there would be any support by their own "constituents" for violence or "terror" as means for political ends at all, a careful "target selection" is more necessary than ever to get any legitimization. The pictures of March 11 have shown that there was no target selection at all.

It could be argued at this point that a (not yet visible) dissident faction within ETA has joined forces with Al-Kaida and "jointly" carried out the attack. However, any such new "Real ETA" would have to suffer the same fate as the "Real IRA": The Real IRA's 1998 bombing in Omagh, in which 29 civilians were killed, was designed to "spoil" the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement. The public outrage, the fact the Gerry Adams for the first time ever condemned a Republican attack, led to a marginalization of the group. The groups' own self-reflection led to a unilateral cease-fire in August 1998 and a suspension of its military action: "We offer apologies to the civilians.7 Their leader, Michael McKevitt, was charged for directing terrorism for a 20-year jail sentence in August 2003.

So let us modify Münkler's thesis with respect to domestic armed groups: There are two parallel developments occurring. One is the growing clandestine nature of international terrorism with their savage character. This in return, however, led to a process of reconsidering amongst domestic armed groups, whose strategy became more and more under negative spotlight. "Bin Laden's 'discrediting'" (Adams) left them now being more and more constraint in their domestic armed struggles. For the IRA, for example, it was clear after September 11, that there was no way of going back to war.

The famous explanation of Mao "the water and the fish" can be used to describe these new dynamics: ETA's situation was like a fish in an already leaking aquarium. An indiscriminative attack like today would have not only emptied the aquarium, but would have crushed it. If ETA would have been behind this horrific attack, it would have been their last straw; they would have lost everything of their sympathy. They didn't do it because they couldn't do it.