Coming Apart at the Seams

Hungary, Kosovo and the NATO

At the outset of the war in Yugoslavia, the Hungarian government made every effort to put up a united front. For a while, it succeeded. A six-party bi-partisan agreement was reached, which even included the views of the far-right Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIÉP). Since then, however, this united front has collapsed as support for, and opposition to, NATO action in the Balkans split Hungarian politics into rival factions. Not surprisingly, this split runs along traditional left-right lines.

What is interesting, however, is that the tables have turned from over a year ago. The present opposition parties, made up of the so-called "left" parties of the Socialist party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), were the ones who originally championed the cause of NATO membership. Now they have become outspoken critics of the military alliance.

This hasn't escaped the noticed of mainstream media, which has since brought this apparent change of heart into the open. Many observers see the present stance of the opposition as political cynicism and outright hypocrisy. For their part, the Socialists defend their present views toward NATO and Hungarian involvement by invoking a reaction that is common to many suffering from war weariness and nagging guilt: according to Lázsló Kovács, leader of the MSZP, the situation has changed since the first few weeks of the bombing; NATO policy at this point is wrong, and the only way to come to a solution is to first stop the bombing and to try and come to a solution through diplomatic means.

The only party on the left which has thus far maintained its stance from the beginning is the Worker's party, heirs of the former Communist party. Although not in parliament, it has always been an outspoken critic of NATO membership and the present policy toward Yugoslavia. While at the beginning of the war it had kept its silence, it quickly made its views known as soon as it was clear that the war was not going to be a short and sweet affair.

What is more surprising than the about-face of the MSZP and SZDSZ is the stance of MIÉP. Like the Worker's party, it was vehemently opposed to NATO membership. However, now that it sees a chance to put forth some of its revisionist policies, its opposition to NATO has been toned down substantially. Although not fully supporting NATO policy in the Balkans, MIÉP is neither wholly opposed. Their official line is that since Hungary is now a part of the alliance and, at this stage, while Hungarian involvement is minimal, they can't and shouldn't upset the status quo. Rather, they have to wait for the end when the situation plays itself out.

Behind this rhetoric, of course, is the real reason for MIÉP compliance: possible revision of Hungary's borders. An opportunity has now presented itself whereupon Hungary can make certain claims to areas lost to Yugoslavia decades ago. According to MIÉP rationale, since Yugoslavia is being carved up anyway, it's time for Hungary to take its share. Realising at this point that outright annexation is a foolhardy move and could even be politically lethal, MIÉP at this point is concerned with obtaining a strong form of autonomy for the Vojvodina region.

This strong stance of MIEP, naturally, was not reflected in the initial bi-partisan agreement. Nevertheless, the ruling party and its junior coalition partners - FIDESZ, the MDF, and the Smallholders - have adopted the line that autonomy for Vojvodina needs to be addressed by NATO. Implicitly, Hungary expects as much for its minimal involvement in the conflict and, if called upon for a more active role in the future, this expectation will surely become a more explicit demand.

It this official line on the part of the government which may yet cause problems for Hungary. The concern is not so much with Yugoslavia but with Romania. Romanian and Hungarian relations have always been strained, although it has improved in recent years with the election of a more moderate government in Bucharest. Still, Romanian reaction to Hungary's stance over Vojvodina is not that difficult to foresee. If Hungary succeeds in obtaining a certain amount of autonomy for the Serbian province, then the fear is Transylvania would be next. In this case, more conservative and nationalist elements in Romania would surely come to the fore in order to safeguard what they consider to be a threat to their national sovereignty. In turn, this would surely lead to the reversal of any programs to accommodate the large Hungarian minority, which numbers 2 million, and other negotiations already underway, such as the establishment of a Hungarian language university in the town of Cluj (Kolosvár), which would be shelved indefinitely.

Aware of such fears, the government has made some public overtures to try and soothe any ruffled feathers in Romania. An example was the recent public announcement that Hungary wishes Romania to be a part of NATO as soon as possible.

Yet such pronouncements are clearly cosmetic. As the case of Turkey and Greece amply demonstrate, just because two countries are a part of NATO doesn't mean old rivalries are forgotten. Indeed, they are still very much alive and can even lead to war. The problem of Transylvania is a very real one. The conflict in Kosovo started out in a similar way: a province with a large ethnic minority (whose home country actually borders the province) agitates for basic minority rights and, eventually, through impotent European policy and rambo-style American politics (remember RAMBOuillet in France?), opens the pandora box that is the Balkans which, for the past decade, has led to continuous wars and civil unrest. Ironically, it has also lead to the ultimate destruction of Kosovo, the area at the heart of it all.

Unless the Hungarian government is fully aware of the dangers that exist, not only for the country but the entire region, then Santayana's dictum about the lessons of history may not only prove to be axiomatic, but will also act as a curse on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - one that will be inevitably carried over into the Third Millennium.